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put you out of business.”1
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INTRODUCTION

This past decade, local governments have drawn increasing
criticism for fine, fee, and forfeiture abuses. Detractors accuse
state and local police, prosecutors, and judges of propping up a
runaway system of profit-driven enforcement, in which decisions
are guided less by legal principle than prospective municipal
revenue.2 Although few states and localities release the
necessary data for an exact accounting of total municipal
revenue, a conservative estimate of funds generated by these
quasi-criminal sanctions runs into the tens—if not hundreds—
of billions per year.3 Even the Supreme Court recently signaled
its disquiet, issuing an ominous warning in Timbs v. Indiana
that punishing-for-profit undermines a slew of constitutional
liberties, alongside the Court’s unanimous holding that the
Excessive Fines Clause is applicable to the States.4
While the growing attention to reform of profit-driven
policing is encouraging, in “Fine-Tuning” I argue that legal
scholars and other advocates for reform have uncritically
neglected an equally dangerous, and inextricably interrelated,
enforcement trend. Specifically, proponents of reform have
2. See Review of Federal Asset Forfeiture Program: Hearing Before the
Legis. and Nat’l Sec. Subcomm. of the Comm. on Gov. Operations, 103rd Cong.
177 (1994) (quoting former director of the DOJ Asset Forfeiture Office
admitting “[w]e had a situation in which the desire to deposit money in the
asset forfeiture fund became the reason for being of forfeiture, eclipsing in
certain measures the desire to effect fair enforcement of the laws as a matter
of pure law enforcement objectives.”).
3. See, e.g., Michael Sallah et al., Stop and Seize, WASH. POST (Sept. 6,
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2014/09/06/stop-andseize/ (reporting that “298 [state and local] departments and 210 task forces
have seized the equivalent of 20 percent or more of their annual budgets since
2008.”); Briana Hammons, Tip of the Iceberg: How Much Criminal Justice Debt
Does the U.S. Really Have?, FINES & FEES JUST. CTR., 4 (2021),
https://finesandfeesjusticecenter.org/content/uploads/2021/04/Tip-of-theIceberg_Criminal_Justice_Debt_BH1.pdf (estimating $27.6 billion in
outstanding criminal justice court debt based on data from the fourteen U.S.
states publishing total court debts and eleven states providing partial data).
4. See 139 S.Ct. 682, 689 (2019) (“For good reason, the protection against
excessive fines has been a constant shield throughout Anglo-American history:
Exorbitant tolls undermine other constitutional liberties. Excessive fines can
be used, for example, to retaliate against or chill the speech of political
enemies, as the Stuarts' critics learned several centuries ago. Even absent a
political motive, fines may be employed ‘in a measure out of accord with the
penal goals of retribution and deterrence,’ for ‘fines are a source of revenue,’
while other forms of punishment ‘cost a State money.’”) (citations omitted).
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ignored police- and prosecutor-led civil enforcement actions that
impose putatively non-pecuniary sanctions with far-reaching
economic costs, all in the plain service of achieving penal goals
traditionally associated with arrest-based prosecutions. Indeed,
in major cities and counties across America today, police and
prosecutors now wield a variety of centuries-old civil and
administrative actions—such as abatement, eviction, and
license revocation—historically reserved to private litigants and
non-uniformed municipal agencies. And despite the Timbs
Court’s warning, constitutional challenges to civil enforcement
abuses hold little immediate promise given existing Supreme
Court caselaw exempting non-monetary sanctions from Eighth
Amendment protection and a procedural due process and Bill of
Rights jurisprudence hopelessly mired in anachronistic
“criminal” and “civil” enforcement distinctions by which
defendants in publicly filed civil actions enjoy minimal if any
protection from governmental overreach.
This Article seeks to recover the shared history and
purposes of profit-driven enforcement, order-maintenance
policing, and police- and prosecutor-led civil enforcement in
America. I document a pattern of constitutional avoidance in
the pursuit of purely penal objectives, with uniquely devastating
consequences for the predominantly Black and Hispanic lowand middle-income renters, small businesses owners, and
employees targeted for police- and prosecutor-led civil
enforcement.
Exposing the commonalities between civil enforcement
tactics involving non-pecuniary sanctions and fine, fee, and
forfeiture abuses represents an important corrective to the
existing scholarly literature. Many commentators have posited,
for instance, that revenue-generating state and local policing
efforts were byproducts of federal forfeiture reforms and
municipal economic crises in the 1980s.5 As the explanation
goes, the windfall revenues promised by federal-state
cooperative enforcement initiatives led cash-strapped cities to
duplicate federal forfeiture initiatives in the substance and
procedure of state and local law.6 However, as “Fine-Tuning”
5. See, e.g., DICK M. CARPENTER II ET AL., INST. FOR JUST., POLICING FOR
PROFIT: THE ABUSE OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE 25 (2d ed. 2015),
https://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/policing-for-profit-2nd-edition.pdf.
6. See John R. Emshwiller & Gary Fields, Federal Asset Seizures Rise,
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documents, this narrative ignores the various state and local
civil enforcement remedies that emerged as early as the 1970s,
many of which are based in abatement or eviction with no
analogue in federal legislation.
If political and budgetary incentives do not alone explain the
continued rise of punishing-for-profit enforcement tactics among
states and localities, what drives its unstoppable growth? I
propose that—far from a policy choice made solely by the
political branches—the primary driver of these enforcement
trends is the federal judiciary’s asymmetrical approach to
publicly filed criminal versus civil and administrative
proceedings. This suggests the judiciary is not only the leading
cause of, but a potential solution to, state and local civil
enforcement abuses.
Part I presents a series of case studies detailing three
signature New York City civil enforcement innovations
developed from the 1970s through the 1990s: The Nuisance
Abatement Law Initiative, Narcotics and Bawdy House Eviction
Program, and NYPD Civil Enforcement Initiative.
The
policymakers and agency officials in the driver’s seat of each of
these initiatives made no secret of their overarching strategy—
to circumvent the greater judicial scrutiny afforded to
traditional, arrest-based approaches while generating municipal
revenue in the service of criminal-law-enforcement objectives.
Together, these case studies track a decades-long legislative
reform campaign undertaken by New York officials, which
models similar trends by police and prosecutors across the
country to expand criminal-law-enforcement agency authority
over civil and administrative actions and push the envelope of
procedural, evidentiary, and remedial advantages in civil and
administrative—as opposed to nominally “criminal”—actions.7
Netting Innocent with Guilty, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 22, 2011),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111903480904576512253265073
870 (illustrating that federal-level forfeiture authority exploded in 1990, with
the number of federal statutes permitting forfeiture doubled from 200 to 400
from 1990 to 2010, and federal payouts to participating states surged from
roughly $200 to $500 million between 2002 and 2010).
7. See Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to
Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the
Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1329 (1991) (“Police
and prosecutors have embraced civil strategies not only because they expand
the arsenal of weapons available to reach antisocial behavior, but also because
officials believe that civil remedies offer speedy solutions that are
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New York City is especially suited to this inquiry as the
progenitor of contemporary municipal public safety policies
followed by most major American counties and cities today. New
York’s initiatives are also well-matched to the Article’s topic
because, though cities including Chicago and Los Angeles
tinkered with siloed civil enforcement innovations in the same
period,8 none pursued the kind of integrated criminal-civil
enforcement infrastructure pioneered by the NYPD and
Manhattan District Attorney’s Office.9 Thus, to facilitate
comparisons and contrasts with other jurisdictions, I select New
York City initiatives as distinct but representative models of
common law and statutory reappropriation (as well as unique
organizational, budgetary, representational, and technological
innovations) by which police and prosecutors in America have
increasingly commandeered authority in civil enforcement
proceedings while sidestepping the heightened protections
afforded to criminal defendants.
With this background, Part III turns to the rich social
scientific and legal scholarly literature surrounding OMP-style
arrest-based tactics to draw comparisons and contrasts with its
present-day civil enforcement analogues. Much of the recent
sociological and criminological literature on the subject
questions the efficacy of zero-tolerance arrests for low-level
“quality-of-life” offenses, disputing the methodologies and
assumptions supporting claims as to a positive correlation
between summary arrest practices for low-level criminal
offenses and the overall reduction of serious crime. Introducing
civil enforcement tactics to this efficacy debate opens new and
important lines of inquiry; for instance, cross-referencing arrest
and court statistics with civil enforcement data to assess the
interrelationship of custodial arrests, abatement of “problem
unencumbered by the rigorous constitutional protections associated with
criminal trials . . . ”).
8. See, e.g., L.A., CAL, MUN. CODE § 12.27.1 (permitting administrative
nuisance abatement proceedings); L.A., Cal, Mun. Code § 11.00; CAL. HEALTH
& SAF. CODE §§ 11570 et seq.; CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-090 (broadly
expanding the definition of an abatable “public nuisance”).
9. See, e.g., MARTHA J. SMITH & LORRAINE MAZEROLLE, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., USING CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST
PROPERTY
TO
CONTROL
CRIME
PROBLEMS
14
(2013),
https://popcenter.asu.edu/sites/default/files/civil_actions_against_properties.p
df (“By 1992, 24 U.S. states had passed statutes specifically designed to control
drug activities on private properties.” (citation omitted)).
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properties,” publicly filed tenant evictions, and reductions if any
in the incidence of serious crime. Additionally, I explore the
existing literature on arrest-based OMP tactics to illuminate the
collateral consequences and social and economic effects of policeand prosecutor-led civil enforcement that are deserving of
further study.
In “Fine-Tuning” I attempt to lay the groundwork for a
larger reappraisal of the constitutional implications of
contemporary misuse of civil enforcement authority by state and
local police and prosecutors. Antiquated doctrine has obscured
the many extra-legal factors—e.g., managerial, organizational,
technological—accelerating
civil
enforcement
abuses.
Meanwhile, citizen-led efforts to reform civil enforcement
practices have met with little success due to the unholy union of
pecuniary, among other, interests shared by state and local
legislators and executive officials in revenue generation.
Community organizing efforts have, in a few isolated cases,
admittedly resulted in incremental reforms, such as by
strengthening procedural protections, mandating datareporting, and increasing attorney representation. However,
the enduring constitutional asymmetry between publicly filed
criminal and civil proceedings will steamroll these incremental
reforms absent the intervention of the federal judiciary.
Litigators have thus far gained only limited purchase in
procedural due process, equal protection, exceeding local home
rule authority, and state law preemption challenges.10 And
while Timbs opened up the prospect of Monell challenges to
municipal abuses of monetary sanctions and forfeitures,
reigning doctrine dangerously excludes “equitable” sanctions
such as abatement and eviction from the definition of “fines” for
Excessive Fines Clause purposes among myriad other
constitutional protections originally intended to protect
individual rights against encroachment by governmental
authorities. In the end, it is only by extending the Court’s
contemporary substantive and criminal-procedural protections
to defendants in publicly filed civil enforcement actions that the
Eighth Amendment will fulfill what the Timbs Court has
10. See Sarah Swan, Note, Home Rules, 64 DUKE L.J. 823, 881–90 (2015)
(collecting cases successfully challenging crime-free lease and nuisance
abatement ordinances on grounds such as exceeding the locality's home rule
authority, preemption by state law, and procedural due process).
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declared is the Framers’ intended purpose—”guard[ing] against
abuses of government’s punitive or criminal-law-enforcement
authority.”11
II.

EXPERIMENTS IN THE “LABORATORY OF ORDER”:
NEW YORK CITY’S SIGNATURE CIVIL ENFORCEMENT
INNOVATIONS

Starting in the 1970s, New York City law enforcement
embarked on a two-decade-long quest to develop novel legal
strategies for circumventing criminal-procedural barriers to
arrest-based enforcement.
Beginning with the Midtown
Enforcement Project’s (“MEP”) refinement of the Nuisance
Abatement Law to combat sexually oriented businesses in Times
Square in 1976, the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office
followed suit with its 1988 Narcotics Eviction Program (“NEP”).
Both initiatives contributed to the integrative operations
pioneered by the NYPD Civil Enforcement Initiative (the
“Initiative”), which first launched as a pilot project in the Bronx
in 1991. These three signature programs not only shaped civil
enforcement operations at the time but spawned numerous
departmental descendants, including the Mayor’s Office of
Special Enforcement and the Civil Enforcement Unit, and
affirmatively altered statutory and decisional law in the process.
The collective strength of these initiatives was such that, by
1995, then-Police Commissioner Bratton praised civil
enforcement as among the “most effective enforcement
techniques” in the NYPD’s arsenal.12 The historical record of
legal innovations and attained enforcement outcomes also
support Bratton’s claim. In the present, NYPD “civil” attorneys
are fully integrated into planning, preparation, and execution of
civil enforcement actions at the precinct level. Attorneys in the
Mayor’s Office coordinate citywide, multi-agency civil
enforcement initiatives; and attorneys in the borough District
Attorneys’ offices bring Bawdy House eviction proceedings in
New York State Supreme Court. In the aggregate, these
agencies leverage civil enforcement on a massive scale that
11. Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S.Ct. 682, 686 (2019).
12. William J. Bratton, POLICY REVIEW: The New York City Police
Department’s Civil Enforcement of Quality-of-Life Crimes, 3 J. L. & POL’Y 447,
452 (1995).
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would be impossible in isolation.
Meanwhile, through
interagency data-sharing agreements, the dragnet of arrest,
search, and code enforcement data accumulated as “evidence” is
repurposed in subsequent civil and administrative actions,
easily overcoming the comparatively low evidentiary and
constitutional protections afforded to defendants in publicly filed
civil or administrative proceedings.
As this Part demonstrates, critical to the success of these
programs is their ability to leave the substance of these
historically “remedial” actions intact while expanding the
grounds for violation and radically reshaping the procedural
protections and presentment authority associated with them.
Together with managerial and technological innovations,
proponents of civil enforcement pushed through far-reaching
legislative reforms—e.g., local prosecutors’ appropriation of
presentment authority, bounty-based redistribution of civil
enforcement proceeds—that distort equitable, common law, and
Progressive Era statutory remedies beyond recognition.13
Further eroding the already limited civil-procedural protections
guaranteed by constitutional doctrine and New York statutes,
state and local legislation in the 1980s and 90s gutted service
and pleading requirements, lowered evidentiary burdens, and
expanded the means for securing civil judgments. These newly
secured procedural advantages dovetailed with managerial and
technological advances to make civil enforcement increasingly
practicable for police and prosecutors. The record of decisional
law during this period documents the exponential success of
these practices as time advanced, including the wildly
disproportionate civil enforcement agency success rates attained
against defendants, who faced ever-more fatal financial and
representational barriers in litigation as civil enforcement
reform advanced.14
13. Pre-dating the Court’s criminal-civil distinction, many nuisancerelated statutory reforms resurrected by contemporary civil enforcement
efforts owe their origins to morality policing in the Progressive Era. See Peter
C. Hennigan, Property War: Prostitution, Red-Light Districts, and the
Transformation of Public Nuisance Law in the Progressive Era, 16 YALE J.L. &
THE HUMANS. 123, 127 (2004) (describing a proliferation of nuisance abatement
laws in the Progressive Era that eliminated the common law “special injury”
requirement for private individual standing to bring a public nuisance action
as “the most successful use of public nuisance law in American history.”).
14. Relying solely upon the judicial record to measure civil enforcement’s
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Taken together, the case studies demonstrate that doctrinal
asymmetries between criminal and civil constitutional
protections incentivize state and local officials to pursue
constitutional avoidance. As Nicole Stelle Garnett observes in
her groundbreaking study of order-maintenance-style municipal
property and land-use policy, the criminal-procedural
protections recognized by the Warren Court led municipalities
to shift emphasis from policing to land management
approaches.15
The heightened operational barriers and
liabilities attached to traditional, arrest-based methods
increasingly led states and localities to pursue civil and
administrative alternatives.16 And in Garnett’s reading, by
“transferring the power to regulate disorder away from the
police” to land management agencies, city planners learned they
could mitigate constitutional tort liability and multiply
municipal revenue streams while also sidestepping the
straightjacket of criminal-procedural protections.17 Further,
local leaders discovered that civil and administrative actions
frequently outperformed arrest-based approaches in achieving
penal objectives given the comparatively mild protections for
defendants to publicly filed, non-criminal proceedings.
However, as this Part bears out, this is only half the story.
Far from acceding to the transfer of power, police and
prosecutors engaged in a decades-long campaign of legislative,

impact, however, underestimates its secondary effects due to the
extraordinarily high rate of property owners who, after an initial warning from
presentment agencies, comply with the agency demands to head off costly
litigation. See e.g., SMITH & MAZEROLLE, supra note 9, at 15 (“The first warning
is typically enough to leverage owners to take action. In fact, early research
on the use of abatements in the 1990s found that civil suits were filed in fewer
than 5 percent of abatement actions in cities that initiate warning letters to
property owners.” (citation omitted)). See also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985) (holding that in administrative actions
due process is satisfied simply by “notice and an opportunity” to respond).
15. See id.; see NICOLE STELLE GARNETT, ORDER CONSTRUCTION AS
DISORDER SUPPRESSION, IN ORDERING THE CITY: LAND USE, POLICING, AND THE
RESTORATION OF URBAN AMERICA 100 (Yale Univ. Press, 2010).
16. See id.; see generally Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Order-Maintenance
Agenda As Land Use Policy, 24 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 131
(2010).
17. GARNETT, supra note 15, at 117 (emphasis added). Garnett also argues
that local governments operationalized zoning ordinances and other property
regulations to achieve law-enforcement goals through the concentration or
dispersal of “disorder.” Id. at 102–03.
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organizational,
and
technological
transformation
to
reappropriate the authority of civilian land management
agencies. Indeed, just as state and local officials began to
increase investment in municipal code enforcement to exploit
the constitutional “criminal-civil” divide, local police and
prosecutors sprang into action: propping up special unit pilot
projects, reappropriating presentment authority from civilian
agencies, and inserting criminal-law-enforcement personnel into
complex, administrative code enforcement staffing regimes
through legislative authorization and interagency operational
and data-sharing agreements.
A. The Midtown Enforcement Project’s Nuisance Abatement
Law Initiative
To call Times Square the rotten core of the Big Apple was
already cliché in 1970s New York. Despite Mayor Fiorello La
Guardia’s temporary success denying license renewals to what
he termed the “incorporation of filth” of burlesque theaters in
the late 1930s, Times Square was essentially abandoned to porn
shops and peep shows.18 While some New Yorkers entertained
the district as part of the city’s character, public officials
regarded the area as a sinkhole in which the cost of sanitation
and enforcement dwarfed property tax revenues.
Nonetheless, during the fiscal crisis of the 1970s, Mayor
Abraham Beame advanced an economic development program
that called for the restructuring of police work schedules and the
aggressive redevelopment of Times Square.19 The Mayor’s Office
promptly sought to justify its efforts in the court of public
opinion—in 1976, the chairman of Mayor Beame’s Midtown
Citizens Committee related findings that sexually oriented
businesses in Times Square repelled non-sex related businesses,
undermined the Midtown economy, and attracted “more felony
type crime than non-sex related businesses and that the concept
of victimless crime is a myth.”20 The same month as the
18. La Guardia Backs Ban on Burlesque, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1937, at 3.
19. See Robert D. McFadden, Abraham Beame Is Dead at 94; Mayor
During 70’s Fiscal Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2001 at 1.
20. Peter J. O'Connor, The Nuisance Abatement Law As a Solution to New
York City's Problem of Illegal Sex Related Businesses in the Mid-Town Area,
46 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 57 (1977).
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Committee’s report, the multi-agency Midtown Enforcement
Project (“MEP”) launched.21 The MEP was tasked with three
key functions: planning, inspection, and legal innovation to
“identify, investigate and prosecute illegal activities in the
Midtown area,” particularly illegal sex-related businesses.22
Despite its fanfare, the MEP’s early efforts met a similar
fate as the city’s previous crusades to shutter sex-related
establishments. Early in the MEP’s operation, then-Director
Sidney Baumgarten assigned the project’s legal counsel Peter
O’Connor to develop a legal strategy for shuttering sexually
oriented businesses. In a 1977 article, O’Connor argued that the
problem lay not in substantive criminal law, which presented a
variety of criminal offenses, such as prostitution, promoting
prostitution, and permitting prostitution, let alone the
consequences of a criminal conviction, which encompassed
everything from fines to imprisonment.23 Instead, O’Connor
argued that criminal-procedural protections stood in the way of
effective enforcement of these offenses, writing that “while the
substantive provisions of New York’s Penal Law prohibit [such
operations], the State’s criminal procedure provisions are ill
suited to terminating [them].”24
To illustrate the point, O’Connor offered a laundry list of
criminal-procedural barriers the MEP faced using an extended
hypothetical:
Let us suppose that a police officer visits the
“Happy House Massage Parlor” (a house of
prostitution), and is greeted by a receptionist who
offers him the massage services of any one of ten
females. The officer selects on “Xaviera” (“X), goes
with her to a cubicle, and is there solicited to
engage in sexual conduct for a fee. At this point,
the officer has reasonable cause to arrest X for
prostitution. But the officer lacks sufficient
grounds to arrest the receptionist or any other
21. See id. at 58 n.3 (citing MIDTOWN ENFORCEMENT PROJECT, OFFICE OF
REPORT OF OPERATIONS FOR JAN. 19, 1976, THROUGH DEC. 8, 1976 1
(1976).
22. Id.
23. See id. at 61–62.
24. Id. at 65.
THE MAYOR,
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employee of Happy House for any offense . . . . If
she elects to stand trial, she could defend either
by completely denying the charge—posing an
issue of credibility for resolution by the fact
finder—or by claiming entrapment. If successful
on either defense, X would be entitled to an
acquittal. If unsuccessful, X could face
incarceration for a term of up to three months . .
. . In any event imprisonment of X would simply
mean that, for the term of her incarceration, she
would be prevented from plying her trade. Her
colleagues in Happy House and its owners,
managers, and agents would still have a viable
prostitution business.25
Having noted these barriers to effective enforcement—e.g.,
lack of probable cause for third-party arrests, the entrapment
defense, the perceived leniency of three-months’ incarceration
for a suspected prostitution offense—O’Connor added to X’s
potential defenses by introducing a wrinkle. That is, O’Connor
imagined the situation in which a prosecutor investigates Happy
House by means of issuing grand jury subpoenas.26 In this
alternative fact pattern, O’Connor notes that witnesses could
exercise their constitutional right not to incriminate themselves,
which would trigger the necessity of an eavesdropping warrant
to meet the strict corroboration requirements of the Penal Law,
and the so-called Happy House employees could continue their
illicit operations when released on bail pending an appeal.27
Interestingly, O’Connor failed to account for the common
law offense of criminal nuisance, an action the Penal Law
codifies in Section 240.45 as criminal nuisance in the second
degree. Criminal nuisance is a fitting remedy for O’Connor’s
hypothetical problem, which he described in terms of
prosecuting a certain proscribed use or occupation rather than
individuals, specifically the operation of illegal sex-related
businesses. The statute classifies the conduct of a defendant as
a Class B misdemeanor where a defendant:

25. Id. at 63–64 (citations omitted).
26. See id. at 64–65.
27. See id.
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By conduct either unlawful in itself or
unreasonable under all the circumstances, he
knowingly or recklessly creates or maintains a
condition which endangers the safety or health of
a considerable number of persons; or . . .
knowingly conducts or maintains any premises,
place or resort where persons gather for purposes
of engaging in unlawful conduct.28
However fitting this provision, O’Connor clearly rejected it
as unworkable. Criminal nuisance is an even less attractive
than the prostitution-related crimes detailed by O’Connor. The
criminal offense is necessarily accompanied by the high
evidentiary burden characteristic of criminal proceedings, i.e.,
proof beyond reasonable doubt. In 1964, before the MEP’s
establishment, legislators even added a mental culpability
requirement over concern about the strict liability nature of the
criminal nuisance provision.29 Further, the MEP was no doubt
nonplussed by the offense requiring that the subject condition
endangers the safety or health, and not merely the morality, of
a “considerable number of persons.”30 And New York courts had
also established, by the time the MEP had begun operations,
that “crimes associated with the unlawful use of premises
require a showing of something more than an ‘isolated
misuse.’”31 Indeed, the New York Court of Appeals explained
that to prove a defendant maintains a nuisance requires not
merely knowledge of its existence, but also “[p]reserving and
[c]ontinuing its existence.”32
Whether a product of studied analysis or salutary neglect,
O’Connor concluded that the barriers to enforcing prostitution28. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.45 (McKinney 2021).
29. Notably, the offense of criminal nuisance embodied in former Penal
Law § 1530(1) did not contain a mental culpability requirement but was
instead a strict liability crime. See COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE PENAL
LAW, STAFF NOTES OF PROPOSED NEW YORK PENAL LAW, MCKINNEY'S SPEC.
PAMPH. at 391 (1964).
30. PENAL § 240.45.
31. People v. Galluci, 404 N.Y.S.2d 768, 772 (4th Dep’t 1978) (citing
People v. Fiedler, 286 N.E.2d 878 (N.Y. 1972)).
32. Fiedler, 286 N.E.2d at 880 (citing People v. Campbell, 256 N.Y.S.2d
467, 468 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1965)) (emphasis added).
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related criminal law against sexually oriented businesses were
insurmountable—an entirely different approach was needed. To
resolve the issue, O’Connor devised an elegant solution; instead
of criminal law, why not turn to civil law? In the project’s first
year of operations, this insight led the MEP to experiment with
several civil actions as candidates.33
Definitions of public nuisance abound in New York law,
including noxious weeds or plant or soil exposed to or host to
injurious insect or plant diseases;34 flight hazards within
designated flight hazard areas;35 outdoor advertising signs in
violation of Section 88 of the New York Highway Law;36 “[a]ny
junkyard or scrap metal processing facilit[ies]”;37 multiple
dwellings whose “plumbing, sewerage, drainage, lighting or
ventilation” is dangerous to life or health;38 “[c]ertain cultivars
of black currant”;39 forest insects and forest tree diseases and the
plants or trees infested by them;40 and unauthorized signs,
signals, or markings in view of any highway that might be
mistaken as official.41
Amidst this junkyard of inanities, O’Connor and the MEP
found precisely the mechanism that would become a key tactic
of police- and prosecutor-led civil enforcement for decades to
come. Specifically, the authorization of summary proceedings
for the abatement of public nuisances was codified in the New
York Public Health Law. The provision was adopted along with
a package of related “public nuisance” provisions in the Public
Health Law in 1953 and 1972 covering everything from fat
rendering to bone boiling and the accumulation of water in
which mosquitos breed, or are likely to breed, and even the
bodily excretions of a person with tuberculosis.42
For its part, Section 2320 defines any “place used for the
purpose of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution” as a
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
2021).

See O’Connor, supra note 20, at 58 n.3.
See N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 164(2) (McKinney 2021).
See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 356(1) (McKinney 2021).
See N.Y. HIGH. LAW § 88(8) (McKinney 2021).
Id. § 89(7).
N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 309(1)(b) (McKinney 2021).
N.Y. ENV’T. CONSERV. LAW § 9-1301(1) (McKinney 2021).
See id. § 9-1303(9).
See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1114(a) (McKinney 2021).
See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 1300, 1335, 1500, 2223, 3387 (McKinney
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nuisance.43 As a consequence for violation, Section 2321 provides
that any citizen or association of the county or the District
Attorney of that county may bring an action in equity in the
jurisdiction within which the property is located to permanently
enjoin the maintenance of the illegal use.44 On its face, the
Public Health Law’s newfound definition of a nuisance as any
“place used for the purpose of lewdness, assignation, or
prostitution” seems unremarkable.45 After all, the term “public
nuisance” encompasses a class of offenses long recognized by the
common law providing for abatement or criminal prosecution of
a substantial and unreasonable interference—vague enough as
the standard is—with rights common to the public at large.46
But in determining whether conduct is a public nuisance at
common law, the petitioner must surmount the higher threshold
that the challenged activity represents, among other things, a
substantial interference with the public health or welfare,
whether the conduct is approved by other law, and whether the
conduct is of a continuing nature or produces a long-lasting
effect.47 Section 2320 does not require any such legwork. Where
a statute defines a certain use or occupation to constitute a
nuisance, then the court need only inquire as to the existence of
the use or occupation at issue—here merely an alleged
reputation for “lewdness, assignation, or prostitution.”48
Statutory authorization thus summarily replaced the careful
judicial inquiry that had constrained this far-reaching remedy.
Even more attractive to the MEP, Section 2321 permits
granting a preliminary injunction without a hearing or prior
notice, restraining the maintenance of the nuisance and
prohibiting the removal of personal property connected to the
nuisance.49
Courts are also empowered to issue the
extraordinary remedy of an ex parte restraining order—in a
publicly filed proceeding—pending the decision of the court upon
the preliminary injunction.50 Once granted, the court may
43. Id. § 2320(1).
44. See id. §§ 2321(1)–(2).
45. Id. § 2320(1).
46. 17A FRANCIS X. CARMODY & WILLIAM WAIT 2D, N.Y. PRACTICE
FORMS § 107:38 (Westlaw 2021).
47. See id. § 107:39.
48. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2320 (McKinney 2021).
49. See id. § 2321(4).
50. See id. § 2323(1).

WITH

15

2021

CIVIL ENFORCEMENT AND ORDER MAINTENANCE

153

moreover enforce the terms of the injunction or temporary
restraining order through contempt proceedings.51 If found
guilty on a first violation, the party could be fined between $300
to $1,000 or receive three to six months of imprisonment, while
a second offense portends imprisonment for as much as a year.52
Finally, upon a finding of the existence of a nuisance under the
law, an order of abatement is entered, which directs the removal
and sale of all chattels used in conducting the nuisance, and for
the closure of the building for a period of one year with costs to
the defendant.53 A court could only cancel the order of abatement
where the owner of the premises pays all costs of the proceeding,
files a bond with sureties to be approved by the court in the full
value of the property, and on the condition that the owner would
immediately abate the nuisance and prevent it from being
reestablished for a period of one year.54
Proving the existence of a nuisance is also made
extraordinarily easy for local agencies invoking the Public
Health Law. For instance, Section 2324(3) provides that
evidence of the “common fame and general reputation of the
place” or its occupants or patrons is competent evidence in and
of itself of the existence of an actionable nuisance.55 Moreover,
an admission or finding of guilt for the criminal offense of
permitting prostitution at the premises acts as presumptive
evidence of the existence of a public nuisance.56 The evidentiary
advantage enjoyed by governmental agencies extends not only
to occupants but also to owners, as reputation evidence of the
place or its occupants or patrons is sufficient to establish both
the existence of the nuisance and prima facie evidence of the
owner’s own “knowledge thereof and acquiescence and
participation therein and responsibility for the nuisance.”57
Moreover, to obtain a permanent injunction, the
presentment agency need not prove lack of an adequate remedy
at law, despite the centuries-old prohibition on issuing equitable
relief in criminal cases, because public nuisance is said to be
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See id. § 2327.
See id. § 2328.
See id. § 2329(1).
See id. § 2332.
Id. § 2324(3)(a).
See id. § 2324(3)(b).
Id. § 2324(3)(c).
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“inherently a condition for which the law provides a remedy.”58
And where a municipality is specifically authorized to enjoin a
public nuisances, the commission of a singular act (as opposed
to continuous or prolonged interference) is sufficient to sustain
an injunction.59 Therefore, there is little need to balance the
larger negative economic and other effects of an injunction’s
issuance against the invasion of private rights represented by
the nuisance itself, as is the case in private nuisance litigation.
Indeed, “the rule in New York is that the nuisance will be
enjoined despite a marked disparity between the effect of the
injunction and the effect of the nuisance.”60
The Public Health Law also effectively overruled the
traditional requirements for issuance of a TRO or preliminary
injunction. Generally, a party seeking the drastic remedy of a
preliminary injunction must show a likelihood of ultimate
success on the merits, irreparable injury absent the granting of
the injunction, and that a balancing of the equities lies in favor
of the movant’s position.61 And historically public nuisance
actions placed the burden of proof on the plaintiff for
establishing the “public nuisance . . . by clear evidence before
the preventive remedy will be granted.”62 But under the Public
Health Law and similar legislation enacted across the country
in the past few decades, where a municipality is authorized to
enjoin a specified activity as a public nuisance, the commission
of a single prohibited act in the past is sufficient for a prospective
injunction.
The opportunity represented by this antiquated law was
immediately apparent to O’Connor, but only health officials and
not the MEP were authorized with presentment authority to
initiate Public Health Law injunctions. Instead of merely
appropriating such authority, O’Connor painstakingly
catalogued the Public Health Law’s perceived limitations,
limitations he planned to eliminate if given the chance to draft
58. Wall St. Garage Parking Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 781
N.Y.S.2d 324, 327 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2004)).
59. City of New York v. Castro, 542 N.Y.S.2d 101 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989),
order aff’d, 559 N.Y.S.2d 508 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1990).
60. State v. Monoco Oil Co., 713 N.Y.S.2d 440, 446–47 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000)
(citation omitted).
61. See CARMODY & WAIT, supra note 46, § 107:85.
62. Sullivan County v. Filippo, 315 N.Y.S.2d 519, 539 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970)
(citing Bd. of Health of Yonkers v. Copcutt, 35 N.E. 443 (N.Y. 1893).
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a new law from scratch. He complained, for instance, that the
Public Health Law did not allow the police to immediately close
the premises pending further order of the court. In addition, the
New York Court of Appeals refused to apply Section 2320 to close
an establishment in which topless and bottomless dancers
performed, noting that the law provides only for the institution
of an action against a place used as a house of prostitution rather
than premises known for lewdness or obscenity in which
prostitution did not occur.63 Indeed, the Court of Appeals later
ruled that even if a given property—such as a pornographic
theater or bookstore—is reputed to be used for prostitution,
courts must exercise the least restrictive alternative to cure the
alleged nuisance in accordance with First Amendment
protections.64
The MEP had some success amending the law to the benefit
of the Department, including the addition in 1977 of Section
2324-a, which established as presumptive evidence of the
existence of a nuisance for two or more arrests for prostitution,
or certain degrees of patronizing or promoting prostitution at a
home or residence.65 Flagging the law’s other perceived
deficiencies for resolution at a later date, the MEP resorted to
still other civil actions to rid Times Square of perceived vice. In
so doing, it stumbled upon another underutilized action, this
time for summary eviction of tenants engaged in conduct
qualifying as a nuisance—in other words, a holdover eviction
predicated on a theory of nuisance. This package of statutory
provisions—also known as the Bawdy House laws—was enacted
in 1868 as a part of the New York Real Property Law and New
York Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (“RPAPL”).
The enforcement provision provided by Section 715 of the
RPAPL was intended to diminish “bawdy house”—houses of
prostitution—activity, “and Section 715 was amended in 1947 to
broaden its applicability to ‘any illegal trade, business or
manufacture.’”66 However, the Bawdy House laws were
63. See Comm’r of Dep’t of Bldgs. of City of N.Y. v. Sidne Enters., Inc., 394
N.Y.S.2d 777 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977).
64. See People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 503 N.E.2d 492, 494–
95 (N.Y. 1986).
65. See N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW § 2324-a (McKinney 2018).
66. PETER FINN, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE MANHATTAN DISTRICT
ATTORNEY’S
NARCOTICS
EVICTION
PROGRAM
4
(1995),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/mann.pdf.
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apparently never used by the MEP with much efficiency. The
action would reemerge in 1988 when—under the circumstances
discussed infra Part I.B—under pressure from neighborhood
anti-crime groups, Manhattan District Attorney Robert
Morgenthau launched the NEP initiative, which deployed
Section 715 systematically and to great effect to expel alleged
drug dealers and users from multi-family residences.67
Despite its initial interest in the Bawdy House Laws and
other nuisance-related actions,68 the MEP set aside such
proceedings in favor of the Public Health Law, and the promise
of the Bawdy House Laws were not fully realized until their
resurrection by the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office in the
1980s. Instead of experimenting with these other grounds for
civil enforcement proceedings, under O’Connor the MEP became
preoccupied with reimagining the law itself to fulfill the project’s
tripartite mission—“planning, inspectional, and legal”—
included not only the development of “new enforcement
approaches” but also “analyzing current laws and procedures in
order to recommend needed changes.”69 Thus, in the summer of
1976, Director Baumgarten tasked O’Connor with drafting what
became the Nuisance Abatement Law.70 O’Connor designed the
law as a remedy with unprecedented reach, one that would allow
police to secure near-instant closure of premises in ex parte
proceedings without the inconvenience of criminal-procedural
roadblocks. On July 28, 1977, Mayor Abraham Beame signed
the Nuisance Abatement Law (“NAL”)71 with the instantiation
of the New York City Administrative Code. Subchap. 1. §§ 7-701
to 7-704.
The NAL incorporated lessons learned by the MEP during
its trial-and-error period of operations in several respects.
Important for the later innovations of the Civil Enforcement
Initiative discussed infra Part I.C, unlike the narrowly defined
category of reputed “houses of prostitution” targeted by Section
2320 of the Public Health Law, the NAL radically reconstituted
the definition of a public nuisance to include a smorgasbord of
potential “violations” cutting across many categories—building,
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

See id. at 6–7.
See O’Connor, supra note 20, at 58 n.3.
Id. (emphasis added).
See id. at 58.
See id. at 59.
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zoning, health, multiple dwelling, environmental, alcoholrelated, prostitution-related, gambling, drugs, and stolen
property offenses.72 In addition, where Section 2320 permitted
a court to grant an ex parte TRO, until City Council reforms in
2017, the NAL empowered courts with expansive authority not
only to grant a TRO but also a temporary closing order, or both,
pending the hearing and determination of a motion for a
preliminary injunction.73 The NAL also allowed actions
imposing a civil penalty for certain nuisances, and, if sufficient
proof was presented, the court was to grant an ex parte
application for an order restraining defendants from making a
bulk transfer of inventory and assets pending the hearing and
determination of a motion for a preliminary injunction.74 The
application did not even require written notice of the closure
order. If granted a permanent injunction, moreover, the City
was statutorily mandated to keep the location closed for a full
calendar year and to impose daily fines which virtually
guaranteed the permanent closure of the business and summary
termination of its employees—whatever the social and economic
costs.
Later cases endorsed local officials’ unchecked authority
under NAL. In City of New York v. Castro (1989), for instance,
the Supreme Court of New York County granted an NAL
preliminary injunction against use and occupancy of the firstfloor area of a building where arrests—rather than convictions—
were made on six occasions for alleged gambling activities.75
Just a year later, in 1990, the First Department affirmed the
lower court’s preliminary injunction in Castro, finding no
violation of constitutional due process where immediate closure
is obtained by ex parte order, and ruling that once entered a
closure order may only be vacated by documentary, rather than
testimonial, evidence showing that the alleged nuisance was
abated.76 The First Department also denied the defendants’
Fifth Amendment void-for-vagueness challenge, reasoning that
the term “violation” used in Section 7–703(g) of the NAL, as
72. See id. at 69 n.13.
73. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE. § 7-704(a).
74. See id. § 7-704(b).
75. See City of New York v. Castro, 542 N.Y.S.2d 101 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
76. See City of New York v. Castro, 559 N.Y.S.2d 508 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st
Dep’t 1990).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol42/iss1/5

20

158

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 42.1

opposed to “conviction” as used in subdivisions (a), (b), and (c) of
same, “clearly means the existence of the prohibited conduct set
out” in the cited statutes are sufficient, without requiring a
prosecution or conviction, let alone an arrest, in order for a court
to grant the government’s application for immediate closure.77
In its ruling, the First Department stressed that the proceeding
was “civil in nature, as are the penalties which can ultimately
be imposed,” and that “the court’s jurisdiction on the application
for preliminary injunctive relief . . . . is in rem, and its orders are
enforced against the premises” rather than the owner—ignoring
the centrality of NYPD officers in planning and executing the
summary arrests that served as the basis for the proceeding and
completely unconnected to the outcome of these predicate and
putatively criminal offenses.78
Further, where a locality seeks a preliminary injunction for
threatened harm, as opposed to an injury that has already
become manifest, a court may still issue an immediate closing
order so long as the government makes the showing of a “degree
of probability of occurrence as to amount to a reasonable
certainty that they will result.”79 A standard of review
confounded by boondoggles like “degree of probability” virtually
guarantees an outcome favorable to the government.80 The
orderly parade of state court decisions that followed only served
to shore up this absurdity, allowing city officials to obtain an
immediate ex parte closure order more or less by shuffling some
paper.
In a representative case, the First Department unanimously
reversed a lower court’s order permitting the Wall Street Sauna
to operate all but the upper floor of the sauna where
investigators allegedly observed a single incident of “high-risk
sexual activity” in violation of the State Sanitary Code, even
where the alleged “observation” did not result in an arrest,
prosecution, or conviction, and the observation occurred after
the granting of a preliminary injunction as well as the business
owner’s agreement to prevent such activity from occurring in the
future.81 The First Department ruled in the City’s favor,
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 510 (emphasis added).
Id. (citing N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 7–704, 7-709[c]).
CARMODY & WAIT, supra note 46, § 107:85.
Id.
See City of New York v. Wall St. Sauna, Inc., 778 N.Y.S.2d 883 (N.Y.
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reasoning that the “high-risk conduct was so pervasive at this
establishment that the new management’s promises cannot be
deemed a sufficient safeguard against its continuation.”82 In yet
another representative example just two years later, in City of
New York v. Ring, the First Department upheld a preliminary
injunction against sellers of counterfeit goods, despite their
removal from the premises in the interim, holding that localities
have an ongoing right to ensure sellers do not subsequently
recommence their illegal activities in the same location.83
In short, with passage of a made-to-order statute like the
NAL, the MEP had accomplished something extraordinary; it
invented a policing tool giving police and prosecutors
unprecedented authority unchecked by Warren Court Era
strictures. Nonetheless, the program did not lead to citywide
enforcement of the NAL, and in many ways, the MEP’s principal
goal of ridding Times Square of illegal sexually oriented
businesses remained unfulfilled. As discussed infra Part I.C, the
fact that the NAL’s enforcement was limited to the New York
City Corporation Counsel resulted in the NAL and Bawdy House
Laws collecting dust until the latter was revived by the
Manhattan District Attorney’s Office in 1988 and the former by
the Civil Enforcement Initiative in 1991, as addressed infra
Parts I.B and I.C respectively.
While a failure, MEP did have some success in “cleaning up
Times Square” for several years. For instance, real estate
developer and owner of the Times Tower Alex M. Parker—who,
in 1973, envisioned Times Square as a place for “nice people”84—
had by 1977 cut the power to the state-of-the-art electronic news
bulletin, saying he was “not going to spend another penny to
entertain pimps, prostitutes and criminals.”85 Parker relit the
sign five months later, crediting the MEP’s civil enforcement
efforts, though he went on to sell the building in 1981.86
In the immediate aftermath of the MEP, New York turned
App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2004).
82. Id. at 883–84.
83. See City of New York v. Ring, 823 N.Y.S.2d 145, 146 (N.Y. App. Div.
1st Dep’t 2006).
84. David W. Dunlap, Alex Parker, Times Square Visionary, Dies at 87,
N.Y.
TIMES
(APR.
23,
2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/23/nyregion/23parker.html.
85. Id.
86. See id.
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from the NAL to other land management tools to address Times
Square’s “vice problem.” In the early 1980s, the Urban
Development Corporation (“UDC”) entered into an agreement
with the city in the form of the 42nd Street Development Project,
with the goal of condemning virtually all buildings on 42nd
Street between Seventh and Eighth Avenues.87 After an
extensive land-use approval process—in which the project
navigated the approval process required by the State
Environmental Quality Review Act and Eminent Domain
Procedure Law—and more than thirty-five lawsuits, not a single
condemnation occurred.88 Indeed, the UDC’s chief executive
during the project approval process William Stern now claims
the scheme actually slowed Times Square’s “revival,” and
instead credits local law enforcement efforts that took place
under the Dinkins and Giuliani administrations.89
The 1977 NAL remained dormant until, in 1992, NYPD
attorneys in the Bronx obtained authorization to bring the
actions as part of the Civil Enforcement Initiative pilot project.
By the mid-1990s, the NAL had become what Commissioner
Bratton called “probably the most powerful civil tool available to
the police.”90 The NAL’s alteration of the landscape of nuisance
litigation cannot be overstated, transforming from a focus on
criminal nuisance prosecutions in the early-to-mid 1800s to a
limited, civil variety of public nuisance designed to obtain an
injunction and finally to the NAL’s expansive enforcement.
From 1890 through 1929, a mere 750 written opinions were
issued in public nuisance-related criminal prosecutions—and
only 125 cases in which public officials sought injunctive relief
against a public nuisance.91 In 1994, there were 214 nuisance
abatement lawsuits filed in New York City.92 By 1996, this
87. See Eric J. Lobenfeld, The 42nd Street Development Project: How
Litigation Obstructs Public Goals, 7 PACE ENV’T L. REV. 347, 347 n.1 (1990).
88. See id. at 349–50.
89. See generally WILLIAM J. STERN, PERSPECTIVES ON EMINENT DOMAIN
ABUSE: THE TRUTH ABOUT TIMES SQUARE, (INST. FOR JUST., 2009); cf. Charles V.
Bagli, After 30 Years, Times Square Rebirth Is Complete, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3,
2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/04/nyregion/04square.html?pagewanted=all
&_r=0.
90. Bratton, supra note 12, at 452.
91. See Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance As a Mass Products Liability
Tort, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 741, 805 (2003).
92. See ELI B. SILVERMAN, NYPD BATTLES CRIME: INNOVATIVE STRATEGIES
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number had more than tripled, amounting to 709 cases.93 In
2008 alone, the city obtained 900 nuisance abatement closings
or stipulations.94 The civil enforcement strategy which Bratton
originally claimed would “supplement criminal law enforcement”
began to take on a purpose all its own.95
In closing, Part I.A’s history of the Nuisance Abatement
Initiative is a representative example of the escalating sequence
of legislative and executive collusion typical to cities and
counties adopting civil enforcement methods. Pilot projects
inaugurated by the mayor or other executive officials lead to
proposed statutory reforms, which in turn grant still greater
presentment authority and grounds for violation to police and
prosecutors while lowering procedural protections for civil
defendants.96

IN POLICING 137 (1ST ED. 1999).

93. See id.
94. See Christine Hauser, Among Gay Men, Arrests Spark Concern About
Being Singled Out, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2009, at 33. For recent statistics on
NAL enforcement in New York City, consult Sarah Ryley’s Pulitzer Prizewinning series in the New York Daily News. See, e.g., Sarah Ryley, The NYPD
Is Kicking People out of Their Homes, Even if They Haven’t Committed a Crime,
PROPUBLICA
&
N.Y.
DAILY
NEWS
(Feb.
4,
2016),
https://www.propublica.org/article/nypd-nuisance-abatement-evictions
[hereinafter Ryley, The NYPD Is Kicking People Out of Their Homes]; Sarah
Ryley, Officials Outraged After ‘Shocking’ Report on NYPD Kicking People Out
of Homes, PROPUBLICA & N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 8, 2016, 8:59AM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/officials-outraged-after-shocking-reportnypd-kicking-people-out-of-homes; Ginger Adams Otis & Sarah Ryley, NYPD
to Change how Police Use Nuisance Abatement Law, PROPUBLICA & N.Y. DAILY
NEWS (Feb. 11, 2016, 12:01 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/nypd-tochange-how-police-use-nuisance-abatement-law; Sarah Ryley & Rocco
Parascandola, NYPD Chief: Police ‘Will Continue to Aggressively Enforce
Nuisance Abatement’, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 28, 2016, 3:16 PM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/nypd-chief-police-will-continue-toaggressively-enforce-nuisance-abatement.
95. Bratton, supra note 12, at 451 (emphasis added).
96. For instance, Illinois’ legislative expansion of police- and prosecutorled nuisance abatement powers directly followed Chicago's 1989 pilot nuisance
abatement program, with the Cook County State's Attorney Office securing
amendments to the Illinois Narcotics Forfeiture Act and Drug Paraphernalia
Act in 1990 and 1992. See generally ILLINOIS CRIM. JUSTICE INFO. AUTH., AN
EVALUATION OF THE COOK COUNTY STATE'S ATTORNEY'S OFFICE NARCOTICS
NUISANCE
ABATEMENT
UNIT
26–28
(Nov.
1993),
http://www.icjia.state.il.us/assets/pdf/ResearchReports/Cook%20County%20S
tates%20Attorneys%20Office%20Narcotics%20Nuisance%20Abatement.pdf.
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B. The Manhattan District Attorney Office’s Narcotics
Eviction Program
The story of the NEP began in a crime-ridden three-story
brownstone on the Upper West Side that, ironically enough, was
operated by the New York County Public Administrator.97 In
1986, the neighborhood group Westside Crime Prevention
Program lodged suit Kellner v. Cappellini pursuant to Section
715 of the New York Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law
(“RPAPL”)—which the MEP unearthed during its earlier civil
enforcement experimentation infra Part I.A.98
In Kellner, twenty-six homeowners and tenants neighboring
the premises at issue invoked Section 715’s statutory
authorization of a private right of action to remove tenants from
properties used for illegal purposes after the owner of such
premises has failed to initiate removal after being given notice
of the underlying, unlawful activity.99 The petitioners sought to
evict occupants of 124 Manhattan Avenue after it fell into
disrepair and allegedly became the site for drug dealing and
other illegal activity when the owner died intestate, and the
property reverted to the Public Administrator of the County of
New York.100 Among other things, the aggrieved residents
presented testimonial evidence of themselves being solicited by
street-based sex workers in front of the property, heavy foot
traffic to and from the premises at all hours of the night, and the
testimony of police officers as to arrests made and illegal
substances and drug paraphernalia seized when executing
search warrants at the brownstone.101 Unsurprisingly based on
the facts presented, and despite the presumption against
forfeiture of tenancy where an alternative resolution exists, the
judge ruled for petitioners. But in doing so the judge offered up
some unusually colorful language:
[T]he only effective solution to save this
neighborhood is to vacate the entire building and
97. See Kellner v. Cappellini, 516 N.Y.S.2d 827, 828, (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1986).
98. Id.; see also Jan Roehl, Civil Remedies for Controlling Crime: The Role
of Community Organizations, 9 CRIME PREVENTION STUD. 241, 246 (1998).
99. See Kellner, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 827–28 (citing REAL PROP. ACTS. § 715).
100. See id. at 828.
101. See id. at 828–29.

25

2021

CIVIL ENFORCEMENT AND ORDER MAINTENANCE

163

get rid of all its drug dealers and users. To
effectively remove a cancer, it must be completely
cut out. The actions by the Police Department in
raiding the premises and making numerous
arrests have not stopped or even reduced the
illegal activities in the premises. The Court must
now permanently close this “crack house.”102
Within two years of the boarding-up and mass eviction of
124 Manhattan Avenue, community criticism of the Manhattan
District Attorney’s failure to address the sale of drugs out of
rented premises reached a tipping point.103 Then-District
Attorney Robert Morgenthau’s solution was based on lessons
learned from the MEP’s efforts discussed in Part I.A and the
private right of action brought in Kellner. The “illegal use”
proceeding countenanced by Section 715 allowed action on not
just drug- or prostitution-related grounds but also “for any
illegal trade, business or manufacture.”104 Moreover, the law
established a presumption of illegal use justifying eviction where
in the preceding year two or more prostitution or gamblingrelated convictions were secured against persons on or
associated with the premises of the subject property.105
Morgenthau’s staff conceived of the idea of bringing Section
715 and similar actions systematically using their superior
access to precinct-level arrest and search warrant data as well
as neighborhood contacts cultivated by their Community Affairs
Unit, but this would only be possible if they could be granted
presentment authority that was then-exclusive to the
Corporation Counsel.106 Prior to 1988, the New York City
Corporation Counsel represented the city in all nuisance
abatement actions.107 But Morgenthau secured the authority,
which proved to have an explosive effect on enforcement activity,
similar to the drastic increase in civil enforcement activity
102. Id. at 831.
103. See PETER FINN & MARIA O’BRIEN HYLTON, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE,
USING CIVIL REMEDIES FOR CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR: RATIONALE, CASE STUDIES, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 42 (1994).
104. N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. § 715(1) (McKinney 2016).
105. See id. §§ 715(2)–(3).
106. See FINN & HYLTON, supra note 103, at 43.
107. See, e.g., City of New York v. Goldman, 356 N.Y.S.754 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
1974).
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witnessed in the 1990s once the NYPD secured authorization for
precinct-level use of the Nuisance Abatement Law. Indeed,
Scott Levy convincingly argues that the leading innovation of
the NEP was less the resurrection of a nineteenth-century
statute than its administrative gambit; that is, moving
presentment authority to bring illegal use eviction proceedings
from the Mayor’s Office to the District Attorney.108
While the NEP was initially under-resourced, with only one
assistant prosecutor and one paralegal assigned in the entire
District Attorney’s Office,109 it obtained federal grant money and
began to prove itself with a high eviction success rate, owing to
refined case-screening and pre-trial notification processes.110
From an early stage, prosecutors recognized the novel benefits
of using civil remedies to avoid procedural due process
protections. Peter Finn and Maria O’Brien Hylton document
how prosecutors swiftly came to understand Section 715’s
tactical advantages, including its supply of a lawful means for
otherwise unlawful sharing of police reports with landlords for
the purposes of facilitating evictions.111
Additionally,
prosecutors also correctly anticipated that Section 715 would
allow them to sidestep a 1971 consent judgment entered into by
the New York City Housing Authority, which required
administrative hearings for a Housing Authority tenant
threatened with eviction.112
However, prosecutors knew that Section 715’s true
strengths lay elsewhere, allowing them to escape the same
criminal-procedural straitjacket complained of by MEP
attorneys. On the one hand, criminal prosecutions “take months
to go to trial, during which time the defendants typically remain
on the premises; and even when the defendants are convicted,
brief jail sentences or simply probation (because of jail
overcrowding) enables offenders to return quickly to their
former base of operations.”113 By contrast, the total time from
108. See Scott Duffield. Levy, The Collateral Consequences of Seeking
Order Through Disorder: New York’s Narcotics Eviction Program, 43 HARV.
C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 539, 544 (2008).
109. See FINN & HYLTON, supra note 103, at 42.
110. See generally FINN, supra note 66, at 11.
111. See id.
112. See FINN & HYLTON, supra note 103, at 42 (citing N.Y. Cnty. Dist.
Atty’s Off. v. Oquendo, 553 N.Y.S.2d 973 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1990)).
113. Id. at 44–45.
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NEP case acceptance to removal was three to five months.114
Finally, and again echoing the MEP, the standard of proof of “a
fair preponderance of the evidence,” allows for eviction based on
a single police witness, and that the landlord or District
Attorney need not establish the tenant themselves was involved
in the activity, solely that “an illegal business is being conducted
on the premises which the leaseholder is—or ought to be—aware
of.”115 Section 715 procedure sidestepped what the District
Attorney’s Office bemoaned as the “rigid requirements”
applicable to searches, seizures, and arrests.116
The MEP and Manhattan District Attorney Offices’s shared
dream of being liberated from constitutional constraints aside,
the District Attorney-led NEP was in no way a mere
bureaucratic
duplication—the NEP’s
contributions
of
interagency operational and data-sharing methods are
responsible for much of police and prosecutors’ unprecedented
success in civil and administrative proceedings today. NEP’s
three-step case screening, notification, and court proceeding
procedure illustrates the point.
In the case screening stage, the NEP reviews “every search
warrant that the police . . . execute for suspected narcotics
offenses” and obtains referrals from the police department,
residents, tenant organizations, and landlords and their
attorneys.117 Incredibly, the NEP has secured informationsharing agreements with local precincts related to drug cases
generally, even where no search warrant has been executed.118
And in 2000, the NYPD issued a department-wide Patrol Guide
procedure to facilitate the filing of complaint reports to trigger
the screening process of District Attorneys’ Offices.119
Equally as important, befitting prosecutors’ legal training
and complicating attempts by litigators to hold them to account,
the NEP developed “third-party policing” methods such as
issuing written demands to landlords threatening prosecution
for failure to institute eviction proceedings against “problem
114. See FINN, supra note 66, at 6.
115. FINN & HYLTON, supra note 103, at 45.
116. Narcotics Eviction Program, N.Y. CNTY. DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE,
http://manhattanda.org/narcotics-eviction-program.
117. FINN, supra note 66, at 3.
118. See FINN & HYLTON, supra note 103, at 43.
119. See NYPD PATROL GUIDE, PROC. NO. 214-02 (2000).
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tenants” targeted by the office.120 Pressuring landlords into
pursuing eviction at their own cost, prosecutors not only
conserve enforcement resources but help insulate themselves
from constitutional challenge due to difficulties satisfying the
state action requirement in suits against government agencies
acting as third parties.
In a further attempt to insulate itself from constitutional
challenge and public criticism, the NEP made much of its
allegedly “strict evidentiary requirements” for entertaining an
eviction in the first place, asserting that eviction is not initiated
by the NEP for illegal personal drug use alone but instead drugs
seized must “typically” weigh at least 3.5 grams and that police
records suggest the operation of a drug business.121 Despite the
claimed safeguards of prosecutorial discretion, the NEP reported
astonishingly high enforcement rates; for instance, between
1988 and 1994, the program initiated eviction proceedings in
2,150 out of 5,305 cases screened.122
In the notification phase, the District Attorneys’ Offices
used Section 715 not just to announce its intentions, but also to
maximize its leverage against landlords to maintain
independently filed eviction proceedings. The NEP first notifies
the landlord by telephone, and mails the landlord and the
landlord’s attorney a letter informing them of the suspected
illegal activities and requesting that the landlord commence
eviction proceedings.123 Included with the letter to the landlord’s
attorney are a printout of Section 715, a copy of the executed
search warrant, an inventory of property recovered during any
and all police searches, and a laboratory report of suspicious
substances seized.124 If within two weeks the landlord fails to
take action, the NEP issues a second letter warning that if
120. See FINN & HYLTON, supra note 103, at 40; see also LORRAINE
MAZEROLLE & JANET RANSLEY, THIRD PARTY POLICING 51 (2005) (“Third party
policing . . . involves the police knowing (or being informed of) some general
legal levers, identifying a problem that could be alleviated with a legal lever
and co-opting non-offending persons or organizations to take on a crime control
role. In order to insure [sic] compliance, the police motivate third parties to
cooperate by drawing on some type of ‘lever’ that . . . includes a range of
criminal, civil and regulatory laws and provisions.”).
121. Id.; Narcotics Eviction Program, supra note 116.
122. See FINN, supra note 66, at 4–5 fig.2.
123. See id. at 5; see also FINN & HYLTON, supra note 103, at 40.
124. See FINN, supra note 66, at 5. See also FINN & HYLTON, supra note
103, at 40.
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confirmation of an eviction proceeding is not received by the
enclosed date, the NEP will initiate proceedings against the
tenant and the landlord as respondents, and that if the court
grants relief, the landlord may be required to pay the civil
penalty of $5,000 and reimburse the NEP’s fees and costs.125
In most cases, the landlord agrees to initiate an eviction
proceeding, despite the attendant costs for attorney’s fees, the
marshal, and replacement locks.126 Peter Finn explains the
economic calculus that conspires to coerce landlords into filing
third-party proceedings:
[T]he civil approach offers both a tempting carrot
and a powerful stick for the landlord. The carrot:
Eviction enables landlords to raise the rent of a
new tenant . . . . The stick: The civil court can fine
landlords $5,000 for refusing to act, and landlords
can be referred to the U.S. Attorney for a
forfeiture proceeding if they do not make a good
faith effort to force out drug dealers . . . .127
The NEP further thumbs the scales of justice using as many
“carrots” and “sticks” as possible. For instance, though the NEP
has referred an extraordinarily small number of cases to U.S.
Attorneys, this referral is threatened at an early stage, with the
explanation that such a proceeding may result in the seizure of
the entire building if the landlord fails to institute eviction
proceedings.128 The NEP offers “carrots” as well, such as
arranging for a police officer to appear in court to act as a
witness, and providing necessary paperwork and a staff attorney
or paralegal as liaison to monitor the proceedings and assist the
landlord’s attorney in prosecuting the eviction.129
The combined efficacy of Section 715 actions themselves and
the technological systemization of data-sharing embraced by
Robert Morgenthau’s office create a perfect storm, one which
renders a tenant attorney powerless to litigate a case rendered

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
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See FINN & HYLTON, supra note 103, at 40–41.
See FINN, supra note 66, at 4.
Id. at 11 (citation omitted).
See FINN & HYLTON, supra note 103, at 44.
See FINN, supra note 66, at 4.
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a foregone conclusion. Of the few cases that advance to the
litigation phase, 55% result in the tenant vacating the
apartment before court action is taken.130 Respondents who do
not vacate prior to court action, and manage to contest the
proceedings, are evicted in nearly 85% of cases.131 And a court
dismissal in the tenant’s favor is secured in a vanishingly small
1% of cases litigated, with most dismissed “due to technicalities
in which the landlord failed to follow proper procedure,” rather
than a determination that the landlord or District Attorney
presented insufficient evidence.132
The exceedingly high eviction success rate is only matched
by the shocking number of potential residents who have been
displaced since the NEP’s inception. While the precise number
of individuals expelled is unreported to this day, in the first six
years of the Manhattan NEP’s operation the program expelled
an untold number of residential tenants from 2,005 locations.133
This tally does not even include the NEPs established in the
remaining four New York City boroughs after the Manhattan
District Attorney’s implementation, boroughs which regularly
post higher eviction rates.
While at first the NEP was operated solely by the
Manhattan District Attorney’s Office, all boroughs but Staten
Island followed suit. Although little data has been gathered as
to the NEP’s non-drug-related evictions, the NEP has used
Section 715 not just against drug dealing, but also against
gambling, prostitution, counterfeit goods manufacturers,
weapons trafficking, and other activities.134
In closing, Manhattan District Attorney Robert
Morgenthau’s resurrection of the long-forgotten Bawdy House
law in the 1980s demonstrates how state and local officials
subtly manipulate historical common-law and statutory actions
to circumvent constitutional protections. With a stroke of his
pen, Morgenthau secured New York City prosecutors
unprecedented powers to self-initiate residential eviction
proceedings against tenants in private housing based on one

116.

130.
131.
132.
133.

See id. at 5 fig.2.
See id.
FINN & HYLTON, supra note 103, at 44.
See FINN supra note 66, at 8; Narcotics Eviction Program, supra note

134. See FINN, supra note 66, at 4.
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untested prior arrest, regardless of whether the arrest resulted
in a conviction. The “third party policing” tactics Morgenthau
developed135 targeting landlords without requiring prosecutors
to even initiate court action in the first place radically advanced
prosecutors’ civil enforcement authority.
Morgenthau’s prosecutors—and New York City prosecutors
still today—routinely threaten private landlords with the “stick”
of prosecuting landlords themselves if they do not initiate
eviction proceedings in their own name along with the “carrot”
of police testimony and documentary evidence to corroborate the
tenant’s arrest, allowing the private landlord to easily withstand
the low evidentiary burden in nuisance-based holdover
evictions. More recent developments in the NEP demonstrate
the ever-increasing role that interagency operational and datasharing agreements play in fueling the state and local civil
enforcement explosion, harnessing civil and administrative
investigatory powers to easily defeat civil defendants’ already
meager procedural and evidentiary protections, not to mention
their lack of constitutionally guaranteed counsel.
C. The NYPD’s Civil Enforcement Initiative
On June 21, 1991, Mayor David Dinkins and Police
Commissioner Lee Brown cut the proverbial ribbon on the Civil
Enforcement Initiative (the “Initiative”), personally padlocking
an alleged “house of prostitution” in the Bronx in the presence
of news crews.136 Police snipers on surrounding rooftops looked
on as Dinkins and Brown installed a “six-inch chrome-plated
padlock and chain” on the basement apartment claimed to be the
center of the operation.137 Brown summed up the goal of the
program as follows: “When we can, we will put you in jail. When
we can’t, we will put you out of business.”138 The closure was
accomplished using yet another New York City innovation in
civil enforcement, the Padlock Law signed by Mayor Edward
Koch in 1984, authorizing administrative proceedings overseen
135. MAZEROLLE & RANSLEY, supra note 120, at 51.
136. N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, CIVIL ENFORCEMENT INITIATIVE 4 (1992),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/145550NCJRS.pdf
[hereinafter
INITIATIVE REPORT 1992]; see Gray, supra note 1.
137. Gray, supra note 1.
138. Id.
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by the NYPD Commissioner and NYPD administrative law
judges by which the NYPD Commissioner may order the closure
of any building, erection, or place the Commissioner declared a
nuisance.139
Together with the Padlock Law, the Initiative invoked a
panoply of civil actions, including most prominently the
Nuisance Abatement Law authored by the MEP and illegal use
eviction program pioneered by the NEP discussed infra Parts
I.A-B above—not to mention the city, state, and federal
forfeiture provisions, Alcoholic Beverage Control Law
injunctions, seizures for noise violations conducted pursuant to
the Vehicle and Traffic Law, and proceedings for the revocation
of licenses issued by the State Liquor Authority.140 In short, the
Initiative was the culmination of decades of legal tinkering in
the area of order-maintenance civil enforcement. While the
scope of this Article does not allow for a full survey of these
actions, this subpart outlines the Initiative’s weaponization of
the Padlock Law.
The City Council passed the Padlock Law unanimously, and
Mayor Edward Koch quickly signed the bill into law on
September 10, 1984.141 The bill amended the Administrative
Code to authorize the Police Commissioner to order the
discontinuance of a public nuisance and to order the closing of a
building, erection, or place where the nuisance exists.142 A
“public nuisance” was initially defined to include only premises
where two or more convictions for prostitution, controlled
substance, unlawful manufacturing, sale or consumption of
alcohol in violation of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law,
possession of stolen property, or maintenance of a vehicle “chop
shop” occurred.143 In 1989, New York City Administrative Code
was amended to reduce the requirement to two or more
violations which result in one or more criminal convictions and
one or more arrests occurring within a twelve month period and
added to the category of a “public nuisance” any activity which
separately constitutes a criminal nuisance in the second
139. See generally N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE §§ 10-155, 10-156 (2021).
140. See INITIATIVE REPORT 1992, supra note 136, at 14–16.
141. Remarks by Mayor Edward I. Koch at Padlock Law Press
Conference, Police Headquarters, Police Plaza Manhattan, Jan. 4, 1985, at 1.
142. See N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 10-156a(1)–(2).
143. See id. § 10-155a–d.
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degree.144
Prior to the issuance of a discontinuance or closure order by
the Commissioner, the respondent must be provided notice and
opportunity for a hearing. The hearing is overseen by a Hearing
Officer employed by the Police Department, whose role is to
create a full record and recommend a disposition to the
Commissioner, although the Commissioner has the authority for
final decision.145 The trial attorney prosecuting the alleged
nuisance bears a burden of proof by a preponderance of the
credible evidence.146 The rules of evidence are not to be strictly
enforced by the Hearing Officer.147
Innocent owners have no defense; it is immaterial whether
the respondent lacked knowledge of, acquiescence to, or
participation in the underlying activity or thing constituting the
alleged public nuisance on the premises.148 Each order of closure
becomes effective on the fifth business day after the posting of
the order and may be for a period of up to one year from the
posting of the order.149 A respondent may post a bond or cash
security with a hearing officer, and petition for the order to be
vacated provided satisfactory proof that the nuisance has been
abated and will not be renewed.150
A range of collateral consequences are attached to such an
order as well. In reviewing one challenge by the new owner of a
property subjected to a closure order due to gambling violations
occurring prior to the new owner taking possession of the
premises, the First Department ruled that failure to first
exhaust administrative remedies—namely, filing a petition with
the Police Commissioner to vacate the closure order—barred
recourse to the courts and dismissed the claim.151 When a
closure order is in force, it is a misdemeanor for any person to
use, occupy, or permit any other person to use or occupy the
premises, destruction of a posted order is punishable by a fine

144. See N.Y.C., N.Y., LOCAL LAW 6, 64 (1989).
145. See N.Y.C., N.Y., RULES OF CITY OF N.Y., tit. 38, ch. 10, § 10-03 (1991).
146. See id. § 10-05(b)(1).
147. See id. § 10-05(b)(4)(i).
148. See N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE, § 156b(2) (repealed 2017).
149. See id. § 156e.
150. See id. § 156e(i)-(ii).
151. See Abreu v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 582 N.Y.S.2d 148, 148–49 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1992).
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up to $250 or up to fifteen days in jail, and intentional
disobedience or resistance to a closure order is punishable by a
fine of up to $1,000 and up to six months in jail.152
Utilization of the Padlock Law climbed quickly. In the five
months after the Padlock Law’s passage, the Department had
conducted only eleven hearings regarding the padlocking of
premises alleged to involve narcotics, gambling, and “afterhours clubs,” out of which closing orders were issued to six
establishments, orders of discontinuance to four, and one
hearing decision left pending.153 Within one year of the start of
operations, however, officials claimed they had used the Padlock
Law to halt 417 marijuana operations and 286 gambling,
narcotics, and prostitution operations, with roughly 3,600
arrests made at the targeted sites.154
The Padlock Law both borrows from the strengths of the
MEP and NEP initiatives and benefits from the additional
innovation of internalizing civil enforcement proceedings within
the administrative authority of the NYPD itself. The success of
the Padlock Law is due in large part to the—seemingly
conflicted-out—decisional authority vested in the Police
Commissioner rather than an independent judge. But its
success is also owing to the padlock proceeding’s procedure itself,
which borrows from the illegal use of eviction tactics developed
by the Manhattan District Attorney Office’s NEP outlined infra
Part I.B above. For instance, in instituting Padlock Law
proceedings, a letter is sent to landlords after each arrest on the
premises, pressuring them to initiate eviction proceedings or
face personal liability.155
Still, the Padlock Law did not spring forth fully formed, and
its true impact would not begin to be felt until the Initiative’s
formal establishment in 1991.
In addition to the 1989
amendments strengthening the Padlock Law discussed above,
variations in enforcement architecture began in earnest in 1991.
In the first year of the Padlock Law’s enforcement, 100 of the
152. See N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 156g-h (repealed 2017).
153. Remarks by Mayor Edward I. Koch at Padlock Law Press
Conference, Police Headquarters, Police Plaza Manhattan, Jan. 4, 1985, at 1–
2.
154. See 700 Crime Sites Shut Down by Police Under New York City
Padlock Law, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1985, at 51.
155. See id.
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more than 700 sites closed in the law’s first year reached the
hearing stage, with the vast majority of the others accomplished
by threats to landlords.156 Between the Padlock Law’s 1984
enactment and the Initiative’s 1991 launch, 447 Padlock Law
actions ultimately reached the hearing stage.157 Unfortunately,
however, New York City has not released statistics allowing for
better accounting of post-1991 Padlock Law enforcement
actions.
It is easy to infer that the number of actions increased
exponentially after the Civil Enforcement Unit’s (“CEU”)
launch. From the time of its ribbon-cutting in 1991, the
departmental footprint of the Initiative was extraordinary.
Within two months, what started as a pilot project in the 52nd
Precinct expanded to three additional precincts in the Bronx.158
Within a year, a partnership with the Office of Midtown
Enforcement—the successor of the MEP—brought the CEU to a
Manhattan precinct and secured the Corporation Counsel’s
authorization for a one-year pilot program permitting the NYPD
to independently commence nuisance abatement actions.159 By
the time of Ray Kelly’s first tenure as Acting Police
Commissioner in 1993, the Initiative had expanded to a Queens
divisional level that included five precincts.160 And by 1994,
when the document Police Strategy No. 5 discussed infra Part II
was published, fifty-five precincts were enrolled in the
Initiative.161 With police reformists distracted by other trends,
in 1995, the Ford Foundation and Ash Center at the HarvardKennedy School of Government awarded the Innovations in
American Government Award to the CEU.162
The Initiative was not a success merely because NYPD
attorneys took advantage of prior innovations, or even because
they added to civil enforcement tools through padlock, forfeiture,
156. See id.
157. See Gray, supra note 1.
158. See SILVERMAN, supra note 92, at 64.
159. See id.; see also INITIATIVE REPORT 1992, supra note 136, at 11–12.
160. See SILVERMAN, supra note 92, at 64.
161. See N.Y.C. POLICE DEP'T, POLICE STRATEGY NO. 5: RECLAIMING THE
PUBLIC SPACES OF NEW YORK 47 (1994) [hereinafter POLICE STRATEGY NO. 5].
162. See Harvard Ash Center, The Civil Enforcement Initiative: Finalist
Presentation,
YOUTUBE
(Mar.
29,
2011),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z0MKwFRS-l4 [hereinafter CEU Finalist
Presentation].
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or other novel actions. Indeed, programs such as those discussed
supra Part I.A-B remained geographically limited and selective.
The Initiative’s impact was instead owing to its incorporation of
emergent managerial and technological advances through its
decentralization of NYPD attorneys to bring civil actions at the
precinct and specialized-unit level. The Initiative itself was
designed first and foremost to be relevant to precinct
commanders as “a program that complements the Police
Department’s criminal enforcement activities by instituting
parallel civil actions to support the Police Department’s overall
public safety mission.”163
The NYPD’s official line was that “the Police Department
cannot rely on arrests alone to address” neighborhood
complaints.164 Robert Messner, Managing Attorney of the Civil
Enforcement Unit, described the partnership as a consultancy:
adding lawyers into a police department’s
response to community problems . . . not as critics
of the police conduct but rather as partners with
the police, as consultants to individual police
officers and police commanders . . . our lawyers,
working with police commanders, have come up
with innovative strategies to address community
crime problems; strategies that were never used
anyplace else, they created them, they put them
into place, and they replicated them in various
precincts, they modified them where necessary . .
. .165
But the ultimate audience for the Initiative was seen as the
electorate. Part of the “community policing philosophy” that
served as the centerpiece of Mayor Dinkins’s Safe Streets/Safe
City campaign, the Initiative was intended to “combine[]
criminal and civil remedies into a comprehensive strategy for
solving the problems facing the community of a particular

163. INITIATIVE REPORT 1992, supra note 136, at 13; see also Bratton,
supra note 12, at 451 (describing the civil enforcement strategy as intended
primarily to supplement criminal law enforcement).
164. INITIATIVE REPORT 1992, supra note 136, at 2.
165. CEU Finalist Presentation, supra note 162.
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precinct.”166 From an early stage, the NYPD quashed internal
and external objections concerning the potential for abuse and
waged an aggressive public relations campaign. As CEU
attorney Robert Messner claimed before accepting on CEU’s
behalf the 1995 Innovations in American Government award
from the Ford Foundation and Harvard University’s Kennedy
School of Government, the goal “has never been to use things
like forfeiture or seizure or nuisance abatement as a moneymaking tool. We are using it to address a crime problem . . .
[W]e are not there to punish people, we are trying to address
community problems.”167
In short, Part I.C’s case study highlights the central role of
managerial and technological innovations in the rise of policeand prosecutor-led civil enforcement, which allow law
enforcement officials to leverage the full weight of other agencies
and direct civil enforcement actions and arrest-based tactics
based on statistical modeling.
III.
PATCHING UP “BROKEN WINDOWS”:
CIVIL ENFORCEMENT’S CRITICAL ROLE IN ORDERMAINTENANCE POLICING
For years, elected officials exhorted the city’s numerous law
enforcement agencies to “crack down” on crime without much
success. While isolated special enforcement and pilot projects
like those detailed infra Part I laid the legal groundwork, civil
enforcement activities remained plagued by budget shortfalls
and restricted catchment areas until 1990. Police, prosecutors,
and civilian code enforcement agencies also suffered from a lack
of operational coordination, and civilian agencies jealously
guarded their presentment authority. But as this section
demonstrates, police- and prosecutor-led civil enforcement
operations exploded in the 1990s, particularly under the tenure
of NYPD Commissioners Lee P. Brown and William Bratton,
ushering in the so-called Blue Revolution.168
166. INITIATIVE REPORT 1992, supra note 136, at 1.
167. CEU Finalist Presentation, supra note 162; see also Ryley, The NYPD
Is Kicking People out of Their Homes, supra note 94 (quoting then-director of
the NYPD’s Civil Enforcement Unit Robert Messner as saying, “You have to
remember, it’s an action about a place. It’s not about people.”).
168. See generally Michael Massing, The Blue Revolution, N.Y. REV., Nov.
19, 1998, at 32.
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This history reveals how present-day civil enforcement
tactics emerged contemporaneously with order-maintenance
policing (“OMP”).169 While Lee Brown formalized the legal
architecture for integrated enforcement in the form of the Civil
Enforcement Initiative described supra Part I.C, William
Bratton pioneered managerial and organizational innovations
that, together with his vision for order-maintenance policing,
caused the drastic scale-up of civil enforcement actions.170 For
both Brown and Bratton, civil enforcement was just as if not
more tactically critical to the “new policing” as the far more
visible zero-tolerance approach to quality-of-life arrests.171 In
169. Neither the definition of “order-maintenance policing”—variously
referred to as “broken windows,” zero-tolerance, or quality-of-life policing—nor
its identification with particular tactics is well settled. See, e.g., George Kelling
&William Bratton, Why We Need Broken Windows Policing, CITY J. (Winter
2015),
https://www.city-journal.org/html/why-we-need-broken-windowspolicing-13696.html (“Critics use the term ‘zero tolerance’ in a pejorative sense
to suggest that Broken Windows policing is a form of zealotry—the imposition
of rigid, moralistic standards of behavior on diverse populations. It is not.
Broken Windows is a highly discretionary police activity that requires careful
training, guidelines, and supervision, as well as an ongoing dialogue with
neighborhoods and communities to ensure that it is properly conducted.”).
For purposes of this Article, I use “order-maintenance policing” to denote
policing strategy characterized by summary civil and criminal enforcement
targeting low-level disorder in personal conduct or property conditions. By
contrast, I use “zero-tolerance” and “quality-of-life” policing to refer strictly to
the aggressive use of arrest-based tactics targeting low-level disorder. What
the approaches share in common is the “broken windows theory” propounded
by criminologists James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, discussed in detail
infra Part II, which posits that intervening in low-level disorder interrupts a
developmental sequence leading to serious crime.
For a more nuanced discussion of these interrelated concepts, see generally
BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN
WINDOWS POLICING (2001) [hereinafter HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER];
Bernard E. Harcourt, Policing Disorder: Can We Reduce Serious Crime by
Punishing
Petty
Offenses?,
BOSTON
REV.
(Apr.
1,
2002),
https://bostonreview.net/us/bernard-e-harcourt-policing-disorder.
170. See generally Philip B. Heymann, The New Policing, 28 FORDHAM
URB. L. J. 407 (2000) (identifying the three essential reforms Bratton
implemented, including: use of crime metrics and statistical mapping to
allocate police resources and deploy officers, management reforms tied to these
metrics holding supervisors accountable for performance, and proactive
enforcement activity).
171. See, e.g., William J. Bratton, Great Expectations: How Higher
Expectations for Police Departments Can Lead to a Decrease in Crime, in NAT'L
INST. OF JUST., MEASURING WHAT MATTERS: PROCEEDINGS FROM THE POLICING
RESEARCH INSTITUTE MEETINGS 15-16 (1999) (describing the Civil Enforcement
Initiative as “a powerful tool to combat petty crime and disorder” by
“[s]end[ing] NYPD attorneys into the field to assist precinct commanders in
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short, Commissioners Brown and Bratton were the first to
implement
a
systematic—and
citywide—program
of
interdepartmental coordination to leverage civil remedies for
disorder suppression.
While arrest-based OMP tactics have suffered recent
defeats in the courts and the press, municipal police have
attempted to restyle civil enforcement tactics as “community” or
“neighborhood” policing tools.172
In this way, Part II’s
description of civil enforcement’s pivotal role in OMP
undermines efforts to smuggle civil enforcement tactics under
the umbrella of “problem-solving policing” interventions, which
with the notable exception of Floyd and its companion
challenges to the NYPD’s systematic stop-and-frisk program,
have survived criminal-procedural and Equal Protection Clause
challenges with a high rate of success.173
devising their enforcement strategies. Together, they use civil law—especially
nuisance abatement law, police padlock law, and various forfeiture
proceedings—to augment the traditional police sanctions of summons and
arrest.”).
172. William Bratton himself criticized the “idealized notion of
community policing, in which beat cops organize a community to solve its
problems . . . as unrealistic.” Bratton, supra note 12, at 463–64. Instead,
Bratton contends that at an operational level “community policing” resembles
order-maintenance strategies involving “the reorganization of police resources
and police strategies, including civil enforcement tactics, to help communities
counter the problems that afflict them.” Id. at 464.
173. Though the Floyd plaintiffs lodged substantive due process
challenges, the lion’s share of briefing and oral argument centered on the
criminal-procedural and equal protection dimensions of the case. See, e.g.,
Floyd v. City of New York, No. 08-CV-1034(SAS) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013) (J.
Scheindlin) (enjoining the stop-and-frisk program based on the City’s
deliberate indifference to, and widespread policy or practice of,
unconstitutional stop-and-frisks by the NYPD, targeting black and Latino
residents without reasonable suspicion as required by the Fourth Amendment
and adopting a policy of indirect racial profiling resulting in the
disproportionate and discriminatory stopping of black and Latino persons in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause); Ligon v. City of New York, No. 12CV-2274(SAS), 2013 WL 71800, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2013) (J. Scheindlin)
(enjoining the NYPD’s practice of conducting “trespass stops” outside of
privately-owned Bronx apartment buildings participating in the Trespass
Affidavit Program); Davis v. City of New York, No. 10-CV-0699(SAS), 2012 WL
4813837, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2012) (J. Scheindlin) (granting in part and
denying in part defendants’ motion for summary judgment in lawsuit
challenging NYPD vertical patrols conducting trespass stops in public
housing).
By contrast to arrest-based criminal enforcement tactics like those
challenged in Floyd, OMP-style civil enforcement operations are vulnerable to
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NYPD planning and operational documents in this period
make clear civil enforcement’s central place in the OMP agenda.
It was in the 1994 report Police Strategy No. 5: Reclaiming the
Public Spaces of New York, then-Police Commissioner William
J. Bratton first announced the rationale for the Department’s
emergent policing strategy, proclaiming that “[b]y working
systematically and assertively to reduce the level of disorder in
the city, the NYPD will act to undercut the ground on which
more serious crimes seem possible and even permissible.”174 The
report famously rooted its justification a decade earlier in the
“broken windows” theory set forth by James Q. Wilson and
George L. Kelling in the pages of The Atlantic.175 Wilson and
Kelling maintained that “at the community level, disorder and
crime are usually inextricably linked, in a kind of developmental
sequence,” while conceding that the Newark Foot Patrol study
on which the article was based showed merely that increased
foot patrols reduce residents’ fear of crime and not the actual
crime rate.176 To interrupt this sequence, the authors argued
that police must sustain visibility in neighborhoods to reduce
fear and restore the confidence of residents themselves to
regulate low-level disorder.177
Many scholars have since characterized Bratton’s approach
as misappropriating Wilson and Kelling’s proposal.178 As Jeffrey
other lines of constitutional attack. See, e.g., GARNETT, supra note 15, at 27
(cataloging successful free speech, Eighth Amendment, and vagueness
challenges to certain order-maintenance policies and practices).
174. POLICE STRATEGY NO. 5, supra note 161, at 7.
175. See id. at 6 (referencing George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken
Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, (Mar.
1982),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/brokenwindows/304465/); see generally George L. Kelling, The Newark Foot Patrol
Experiment,
POLICE
FOUND.,
(1981),
https://www.policefoundation.org/publication/the-newark-foot-patrolexperiment/.
176. Kelling & Wilson, supra note 175.
177. See id.
178. See, e.g., K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The
Hidden Costs of Aggressive Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 271, 279 (2009); ANDREA MCARDLE, ZERO TOLERANCE: QUALITY OF
LIFE AND THE NEW POLICE BRUTALITY IN NEW YORK CITY 4–5 (Andrea McArdle
& Tanya Erzen eds., 2001) (referring to “New York’s idiosyncratic version of
James Wilson and George Kelling’s influential ‘broken windows’ theory.”). But
see Ian Weinstein, The Adjudication of Minor Offenses in New York City, 31
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1157, 1160 n.6 (2004) (claiming Bratton “[a]dopted Wilson
and Kelling's Broken Windows thesis as the basis for the city's new policing
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Fagan and Garth Davies argue, Bratton’s idiosyncratic program
of Terry stops and summary arrests for minor offenses reflected
“theoretical and strategic innovations,” including substituting a
focus on police suppression of social disorder for Wilson and
Kelling’s focus on physical disorder.179 Relatedly, in his in-depth
study of the NYPD’s organizational development during this
period, Eli Silverman credits Bratton with consequential
managerial and statistical innovations.180 Wilson and Kelling’s
writings partially support this reading. In their original
publication in The Atlantic, Wilson and Kelling stressed that
“many aspects of order maintenance in neighborhoods can
probably best be handled in ways that involve the police
minimally if at all.”181 And within two years of the publication
of Police Strategy No. 5, Kelling reaffirmed that, in his view,
order-maintenance policing of social norms should be limited to
primarily “non-arrest approaches—education, persuasion,
counseling, and ordering—so that arrest would only be resorted
to when other approaches failed.”182
While these managerial, organizational, and technological
reforms do in fact represent innovations on Wilson and Kelling’s
theory, the tort- and property-based civil enforcement methods
introduced in “Fine-Tuning” suggest a strong linkage with
Wilson and Kelling’s focus on physical disorder.
The
pervasiveness of civil enforcement approaches to the NYPD’s
implementation of “broken windows theory” contradicts
Kelling’s later attempt to divorce order-maintenance designs
from Bratton’s innovations. Put another way, Bratton simply
tailored Kelling’s theory of physical-disorder suppression to the
organizational architecture and technological capabilities of
urban policing, turning law into an instrumentality for

initiative in 1994.”).
179. Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows:
Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L. J., 457, 464,
471 (2000).
180. See SILVERMAN, supra note 92, at 124 (describing Bratton’s
participation in CompStat’s development, a program that became “[t]he
NYPD’s most permanent, far-reaching, and widely imitated innovation.”).
181. Kelling & Wilson, supra note 175.
182. GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN
WINDOWS: RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES 23
(1996) (emphasis added).
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achieving police objectives.183
Civil enforcement proved central to this effort. Indeed,
Police Strategy No. 5 places equal if not greater emphasis on civil
actions as compared to the summary arrest and misdemeanor
enforcement that has dominated public attention.184 And its
discussion of civil enforcement is not merely aspirational; for
instance, Police Strategy No. 5 announces the doubling of civil
enforcement attorneys assigned to precinct commanders across
the fifty-five precincts participating in the Civil Enforcement
Initiative.185 It also details the NYPD’s efforts to build out the
civil enforcement infrastructure through staffing and training
initiatives designed to accomplish a variety of civil enforcement
actions: vehicle forfeiture of those suspected to patronize the
street-based sex trade; Nuisance Abatement Law proceedings
targeting smoke shops, crack houses, and illegal massage
parlors; and administrative proceedings seeking the revocation
of alcohol and street vendor licenses.186 Further, Police Strategy
No. 5 lays the groundwork for interagency and
intergovernmental cooperation agreements to expand civil
enforcement’s reach, including a partnership between New York
City’s Civil Enforcement Initiative and the State Liquor
Authority to overcome laws inhibiting NYPD undercover
operations in connection with liquor license inspections and
183. Bratton’s experimentation with OMP tactics pre-dates his tenure as
NYPD Commissioner. For instance, as chief of the New York City Transit
Police from 1990 to 1992, Bratton retooled the division to aggressively pursue
summary arrests for misdemeanors and violations directly associated with
physical disorder in the New York transit system. SILVERMAN, supra note 92,
at 81. One 1991 report dating from Bratton’s leadership of the Transit Police
Department reports a 35% uptick in summonses (totaling 205,452) and 473%
increase in ejections for rules violations—fare beating, panhandling,
unauthorized sales, overstretch, and sleeping in the subway—that encompass
not only disorderly persons but non-conforming usages of the physical
environment. See N.Y. TRANSIT POLICE DEP'T, THE NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT
POLICE VISION FOR THE 1990S: TAKING BACK THE SUBWAY FOR THE PEOPLE OF
NEW YORK 17 (1991).
184. See POLICE STRATEGY NO. 5, supra note 161.
185. See id. at 9. See also Andrew Ingram, Breaking Laws to Fix Broken
Windows: A Revisionist Take on Order Maintenance Policing, 19 BERKELEY J.
CRIM. L. 112 (2014) (arguing that better community outcomes are obtained
when police discretion is guided by legal principles rather than treated as an
instrumentality for obtaining criminal law enforcement objectives). But see
SILVERMAN, supra note 92, at 138 (noting that contemporaneous NYPD
documents report an even more dramatic civil-enforcement staffing increase).
186. See POLICE STRATEGY NO. 5, supra note 161, at 38–40.
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revocation proceedings.187
The correlation between Wilson and Kelling’s focus on
physical disorder and Bratton’s civil enforcement innovations is
similarly borne out by related departmental planning
documents issued in this same period. For example, Police
Strategy No. 2: Curbing Youth Violence in the Schools and on the
Streets explicitly targets premises catering to youth for civil
enforcement proceedings: “Action will be taken against alcohol
and cigarette sales to minors, and against video arcades, pool
halls, bowling alleys, and movie theaters found to be in violation
of the law.”188 Police Strategy No. 2 supplements this placebased approach with a social-order policing model involving the
strict enforcement of graffiti, noise, drinking, and disorderly
conduct in areas surrounding school property, while confirming
departmental efforts to expand interagency partnerships like its
renegotiation of reporting protocols with the Chancellor of the
Board of Education.189
Police Strategy No. 3: Driving Drug Dealers Out of New York
also places great emphasis on civil enforcement, reflecting the
NYPD’s early focus on civil and administrative remedies for
narcotics and gambling-related activities.190 The report boasts
of twenty-six new attorney hires under the newly created Civil
Enforcement Unit and assigned to Borough, Division, and
Precinct Commanders to supplement their efforts in order to
rapidly “close locations and seize assets used or gained in illegal
activity.”191 Police Strategy No. 3 goes on to describe the growing
number of powerful civil and administrative remedies at the
NYPD’s disposal—including the nuisance abatement, narcotics
eviction, license revocation, and forfeiture proceedings outlined
in Part I—by virtue of the NYPD’s collaborative interagency
agreements:
Under the Nuisance Abatement Law, the New
York Supreme Court can close locations where
187. See id. at 32–33.
188. N.Y.C. POLICE DEP'T, POLICE STRATEGY NO. 2: CURBING YOUTH
VIOLENCE IN THE SCHOOLS AND ON THE STREETS 28 (1994).
189. See id. at 28.
190. N.Y.C. POLICE DEP'T, POLICE STRATEGY NO. 3: DRIVING DRUG DEALERS
OUT OF NEW YORK 17 (1994).
191. Id.
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there were three violations for narcotics or
gambling activity. Under the Padlock Law, the
Police Commissioner is authorized to close a
location where two or more narcotics or gambling
violations resulted in at least one arrest and
conviction within the last year. Working with the
Corporation Counsel and the District Attorneys,
the Civil Enforcement Unit will secure evictions of
individuals who are dealing drugs. They will
facilitate seizure of drug paraphernalia and
closure of stores selling them. And they will
facilitate sustained efforts to confiscate cars
which are being used to transport narcotics. The
Civil Enforcement Unit will expand efforts to
assist the District Attorneys’ Offices and the U.S.
Attorneys’ Offices to notify landlords of
widespread illegal activity in their buildings and
then, if no action is taken, to seize these
buildings.192
In sum, scholars of OMP are wrong to neglect civil
enforcement. While critics of arrest-based OMP-style policing
have made progress in reform, present-day civil enforcement
operations remain faithful to the same approaches outlined by
the NYPD in its early OMP planning documents. This
operational continuity is a testament to the decades-long
development of New York City’s civil enforcement system, which
demands a parallel in the scholarly literature critical of the
efficacy and consequences of OMP. In the following section, the
value of this effort is shown by comparing OMP-style civil and
criminal enforcement methods.
IV.

THE TROUBLE WITH “ORDER”: QUESTIONING THE EFFICACY,
RACIAL AND ECONOMIC DISPARITIES, AND COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES OF AGGRESSIVE CIVIL ENFORCEMENT

After over thirty years of contentious academic discourse
surrounding OMP, much of the legal and social scientific
literature on policing has moved on to other features of present192. Id. at 17.
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day policing that urgently deserve attention—implicit bias,
disciplinary practices, departmental diversity, policecommunity relations, police-involved killings, and so on. In this
Part, I make a case for reviving OMP-related research in the
context of police- and prosecutor-led civil enforcement, surveying
the rich academic literature on OMP criminal enforcement
methods to compare the causal, constitutional, socio-economic,
and other implications of OMP-style civil enforcement.
First, I review empirical studies concerning the utility of
arrest-based OMP interventions in reducing serious crime to
identify metrics for evaluating the efficacy of civil enforcement
in future research. In addressing the research into OMP’s
efficacy, I also demonstrate how social scientific studies of OMP
as traditionally understood will benefit from more robust
understanding of place-based enforcement practices, as the
geographically diffuse but institutionally specific (e.g., public
schools, transit, and housing) actions common to contemporary
civil enforcement introduce new variables. I also review the
related procedural justice literature on the “trust deficit”
fostered by discriminatory and arbitrary police practices,
connecting these insights to the civil enforcement context.
Next, I describe the community-wide social and economic
impacts of police- and prosecutor-led civil enforcement. In the
abstract, “property owners” might seem a less disadvantaged
class than those without property in issue—public housing
residents subjected to trespass stops in hallways or homeless
persons cycled in and out of custody for their mere proximity to
Times Square—but to assume a lack of identity between affected
communities is a serious mistake. Police- and prosecutor-led
civil enforcement disproportionately targets low-income, Black,
and Latino defendants: renters in rent-regulated or subsidized
housing, for instance, evicted by landlords pressured in thirdparty Bawdy House law actions or directly by NAL actions; 193
sole proprietor bodegas, delicatessens, taxi-dance bar owners
193. See, e.g., Sarah Ryley, How We Did Our Analysis of New York City
Nuisance Abatement Cases, PROPUBLICA & N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 5, 2016, 9:00
AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-we-did-our-analysis-of-new-yorkcity-nuisance-abatement-cases (noting that many residents charged with
nuisance abatement actions in 2013 and 2014 “agreed” to warrantless searches
of their homes as a condition of being to return, while others agreed to
automatically forfeit their lease upon merely being accused of wrongdoing in
the future).
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shattered, and their employees sacked when coerced into costly
stipulations or face lost profits and mounting legal fees upon
being served with ex parte NAL closure orders;194 low-income
vehicle owners and lessors whose vehicles are seized, forfeited,
and auctioned off by the NYPD after summary decisions by
NYPD-appointed agency judges.
A. Questioning Causation: Does Order-Maintenance-Style
Criminal or Civil Enforcement Reduce Serious Crime?
Although recent systematic reviews of the social scientific
literature concerning the efficacy of OMP arrest-based practices
conclude there is no evidence these tactics reduce serious
crime,195 for more than a decade, the efficacy debate raged
among sociologists, criminologists, and legal scholars.
Definitional confusion characterized early debate but was
resolved by distinguishing between “broken windows theory”—
as a criminological hypothesis of the dynamic interrelationship
between physical disorder, social deviance, and governmental
interventions—and its as-applied iterations in municipal law
enforcement practices such as “zero-tolerance” or “quality-oflife” policing.
While I have no intention of relitigating the efficacy debate
specific to arrest-based tactics, the literature is instructive for
identifying metrics for evaluating the relative efficacy, if any, of
OMP-style civil enforcement practices in reducing serious crime.
Among other themes, critics of OMP arrest practices argued that
existing social scientific studies attempting to measure

194. See also Bryan M. Seiler, Note, Moving from “Broken Windows” to
Healthy Neighborhood Policy: Reforming Urban Nuisance Law in Public and
Private Sectors, 92 MINN. L. REV. 883, 893–94, 904–05 (2008) (suggesting that
public nuisance actions in civil court may be the most common form of publiclyfiled civil action due to the lower standard of proof in civil courts and that
public nuisance actions are often fueled by race-based agendas at the
community level).
195. See, e.g., Anthony A. Braga, et. al., Disorder Policing to Reduce
Crime: A Systematic Review, CAMPBELL SYSTEMATIC REVS. 1, 1 (Sept. 8, 2019)
(concluding that “aggressive, order maintenance approaches” do not generate
crime reductions comparable to those achieved by community and problemsolving approaches based on systematic review of evidence presented by 28
social scientific studies including nine randomized controlled trials); Anthony
A. Braga, et. al., Can Policing Disorder Reduce Crime? A Systematic Review
and Meta-Analysis, 52 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 567–68 (2015).

47

2021

CIVIL ENFORCEMENT AND ORDER MAINTENANCE

185

“disorder” (and so also assessing the effectiveness of OMP-style
efforts to reduce it) are inherently skewed by normative
judgments unsuited to scientific methods. Additionally, many
researchers argued that even if objective measurement were
possible, the existing data simply does not support claims that
OMP tactics were responsible for decreasing crime rates in the
1990s; indeed, falling crime rates were experienced not only in
cities that adopted OMP-style methods but those without.196 In
OMP’s place, scholars have advanced a wide variety of
competing explanations for 1990s crime reduction, ranging from
declining use of crack cocaine, decreases in the relative
population of sixteen to twenty-four-year-old men, and a rise in
college enrollment.197
Empirical studies attempting to objectively measure civil
enforcement’s effects on crime reduction would do well to avoid
being paralyzed by the fuzzy metrics and intervening variables
that plagued research into OMP-style arrest practices. For
instance, in his influential Disorder and Decline, OMP
proponent Wesley Skogan claimed to link perceptions of arealevel disorder with neighborhood crime problems based on the
combined results of five different studies of neighborhood crime
problems between 1977 and 1983 consisting of qualitative
surveys of 13,000 adult residents across forty residential urban
neighborhoods.198
Additionally, Skogan attempted to
supplement his anecdotal findings with targeted evaluations of
special enforcement initiatives adopted in several major cities
(e.g., foot patrols, team policing, administrative decentralization
to local storefront offices).
Skogan’s research drew widespread criticism. For instance,
Bernard Harcourt replicated Skogan’s survey-based study and
found that the statistics did not support his conclusion. 199
196. See Howell, supra note 178, at 276 n.20; see also Steven D. Levitt,
Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors that Explain the
Decline and Six that Do Not, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 163 (2004).
197. See generally ANDREW KARMEN, NEW YORK MURDER MYSTERY: THE
TRUE STORY BEHIND THE CRIME CRASH OF THE 1990S (2000); HARCOURT,
ILLUSION OF ORDER, supra note 169; STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER,
FREAKONOMICS: A ROGUE ECONOMIST EXPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF
EVERYTHING (2005).
198. See WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE
SPIRAL OF DECAY IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 18–19, 187–90 (1990).
199. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the
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Harcourt found that: Skogan’s data omitted key variables; his
inadequate sample size of at most forty neighborhoods
undermined the strength of his conclusions; and that even if
accepting these variations, certain types of crime like rape,
purse-snatching, and pick-pocketing are not significantly
related enough to disorder perception to draw larger conclusions
as to OMP’s efficacy; that even physical assault and burglary
rates are not sufficiently indicative of objectively perceivable
disorder when neighborhood poverty, stability, and race are held
constant; and that Skogan only correlated robbery with
objectively perceived disorder because the five Newark
neighborhoods exert outlier influence on the statistical findings
and were non-representative of the larger sample.200 Separately,
Bernard Harcourt and Jens Ludwig tested the theories of
Skogan, Kelling, and William Sousa in a study comparing New
York City crime and arrest data, census tract-level measures of
socio-demographic characteristics, and a measure of the number
of police officers assigned to each precinct by year.201 The
evaluation concluded there was “no empirical evidence to
support the view that shifting police towards minor disorder
offenses would improve the efficiency of police spending and
reduce violent crime.”202
The concept of “disorder” itself has been subject to a wealth
of scholarly criticism, including the argument that “order” and
“disorder” are incapable of formal definition and vulnerable to
racial and other biases.203 For instance, Robert Sampson and
Stephen Raudenbush showed that residents of all races report
heightened disorder where there is a higher concentration of
Black or Latino neighbors, even where objective manifestations
of disorder in neighborhood conditions, such as boarded-up
buildings and trash-littered streets, are equal.204 Their findings
Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and
Order-Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 295 (1998).
200. See id. at 295–96.
201. See Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New
Evidence from New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L.
REV. 271, 315 (2006).
202. Id. at 315.
203. See, e.g., Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing
Disorder: Neighborhood Stigma and the Social Construction of “Broken
Windows”, 67 SOC. PSYCH. Q. 319, 337 (2004).
204. See id. at 337.
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suggest that qualitative studies of disorder perception are
distorted by “social psychological processes of implicit bias and
statistical discrimination” in the racialized context of U.S. urban
centers.205
Similarly, given that poor and minority
neighborhoods labeled as disorderly are targeted for heightened
arrest-based interventions, OMP tactics themselves are arguably
“criminogenic” in that increased officer presence results in a netwidening effect.206
On the other hand, subjective community perceptions were
marshaled by Tom Tyler and Jeffrey Fagan to support a
procedural justice critique of OMP’s efficacy, arguing that, far
from reducing serious crime, the economic and legitimacy costs
imposed by OMP-style tactics are themselves criminogenic.207 In
a panel design study of 830 New York City residents, Tyler and
Fagan document how public perception of institutional
legitimacy affects citizens’ willingness to cooperate with or assist
police crime reduction efforts.208 Moreover, Tyler and Fagan’s
study found that community perception of police legitimacy is
linked directly to perceptions of the relative justice or injustice
of the procedures used by the police to exercise their authority.209
These findings echo other research showing that community
perceptions of legitimacy more significantly accounts for
neighborhood crime trends than heightened police presence in
the neighborhood.210 Trends in civilian complaints of police
misconduct tend to corroborate that decreased community
perceptions of police legitimacy result from the implementation
of OMP-style tactics. To return to the example of New York City,
during Bratton’s first term as NYPD Commissioner, there was a
25% uptick in arrests and a concomitant 50% jump in complaints
of police misconduct in neighborhoods in which the NYPD
205. Id.
206. See Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Systematic Social
Observation of Public Spaces: A New Look at Disorder in Urban
Neighborhoods, 105 AM. J. SOCIO. 603, 604–05, 638 (1999).
207. See generally Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and
Cooperation: Why Do People Help the Police Fight Crime in Their
Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231 (2008).
208. See id. at 244–62.
209. See id. at 244–45.
210. See Lawrence W. Sherman, Policing for Crime Prevention, in
PREVENTING CRIME: WHAT WORKS, WHAT DOESN'T, WHAT'S PROMISING: A
REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 227 (1997).
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claimed the sharpest reductions in crime rates.211 Researchers
studying civil enforcement efficacy would do well to account for
perceptions of the legitimacy of civil enforcement actions.
As predictive policing has gained purchase in many
municipal police departments, the social-psychological insights
of Sampson and Raudenbush have proven prescient, and
researchers into civil enforcement should beware of the pitfalls
of econometric models. Bernard Harcourt has thoroughly
documented how leading econometric models contain inherent
biases, skewing any claims to OMP’s actual contributions to
crime reduction. For instance, Harcourt observed that many
predictive models were geared toward maximizing search
success rates (i.e., detection) but based on metrics derived solely
from preexisting crime data—with racial profiling effectively
baked in.212 More fundamentally, Harcourt argues that reliable
measures of actual crime reduction only exist if the “members of
the higher-offending targeted group have the same or greater
elasticity of offending to policing.”213 Put another way, if “the
targeted population is less responsive to the change in policing,
then the profiling will increase overall crime in society.”214
Against the “actuarial” turn in criminal law enforcement,215
Harcourt argues for a “presumption against prediction.”216
The obstacles to objective assessment found in studies based
on crime statistics, social-psychological observations, and
econometric models have prompted some of OMP’s earliest
proponents to reconsider their position.
David Thacher,
211. See Clifford Kraus, THE BRATTON RESIGNATION: THE
LEGACY; Bratton Hailed As Pioneer of New Style of Policing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
27, 1996; see generally Michael Duffy & Massimo Calabresi, The NYPD Chief
Who
Did
His
Job
Too
Well,
TIME,
Nov.
15,
2007,
www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1684512,00.html.
212. See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING,
POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 122–25 (2009).
213. Id. at 123.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1 (defining criminal-actuarial methods as “[t]he use of
statistical rather than clinical methods on large datasets to determine different
levels of criminal offending associated with one or more group traits, in order
(1) to predict past, present or future criminal behavior and (2) to administer a
criminal justice outcome.”).
216. Bernard E. Harcourt, Moving Beyond Profiling: The Virtues of
Randomization, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING: NEW AND ESSENTIAL
READING 505, 509 (Stephen K. Rice & Michael D. White eds., 2010); see also
HARCOURT, supra note 212, at 238.
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previously a leading OMP proponent, announced that he now
viewed OMP’s primary benefits as intangible and incapable of
objective measurement—lessening “fear” and improving
community wellbeing rather than measurably reducing serious
offenses.217 Later, in 2014, Thacher retreated still further,
writing that “‘[o]rder’ and ‘order maintenance’ are essentially
moral concepts, and when we view them through the lens of
social scientific study we risk distorting them.”218
To split the difference, some scholars have proposed ways to
mediate police subjectivity in defining “disorder” and increase
neighborhood-level involvement. Richard Sennett, for instance,
decries the stultifying effects of zero-tolerance enforcement on
urban communities, instead proposing community-contingent
metrics and third-party interventions to facilitate “creative
disorder”—substituting many police-oriented encounters
through community watch associations and informal street
“mayors” such as shopkeepers, food vendors, and licensed youth
and social service professionals.219 In a variation on this theme,
Robert C. Ellickson suggests a kind of superstructure to
constrain police discretion according to a system of red, yellow,
and green zoning associated with different degrees of
governmental intervention in response to “disorderly”
behaviors.220 However, neither approach has gained purchase
with police officials.
B. Race and Class Disparities in Civil Enforcement
Racial disparities in stops, frisks, searches, and arrests
obtained through OMP-style criminal enforcement are welldocumented.221
The consequences to society cannot be
217. See generally David Thacher, Community Policing Without the
Police? The Limits of Order Maintenance by the Community, in COMMUNITY
POLICING AND PEACEKEEPING 55, 55–70 (Peter Grabosky ed., 2009).
218. David E. Thacher, Order Maintenance Policing, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF POLICE AND POLICING 122, 141 (Michael D. Reisig & Robert J.
Kane eds., 2014).
219. See generally RICHARD SENNET, THE USES OF DISORDER: PERSONAL
IDENTITY AND CITY LIFE (1970).
220. See Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City
Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J.
1165, 1220–22 (1996).
221. See, e.g., Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass
Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611, 633 (2014) (noting that between 1990 and
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overstated; while each custodial arrest is effected against an
individual, its systematic application to high-crime areas
undermines the principle of individual culpability and
transforms policing into a method of collective punishment.222
These practices effectively aggregate punishment for low-income
communities where the majority of residents are Black or
Latino.223
Moreover, increases in racial enforcement disparities are
directly correlated with periods of fiscal crises and policies
permitting enforcement agencies to retain seized revenue. For
instance, in a recent study, researchers found that arrest rates
of African American and Hispanic persons for drug, DUI, and
prostitution offenses increased during periods of fiscal distress,
particularly where the jurisdiction permits police departments
to retain revenue from seized property.224
These dynamics are paralleled in local civil enforcement.
While county and city civil enforcement programs suffer from a
woeful lack of transparency, researchers have put existing data
to good use, establishing stark racial, socio-economic, and
geographic disparities. For instance, out of 1,162 nuisance
abatement cases filed in New York City’s five Supreme Courts
in 2013 and the first half of 2014, more than 44% involved
residential premises—among these residential premises, 90% of
residents lived in minority neighborhoods, and among
defendants whose race could be identified only five were nonHispanic white.225 Further illustrating the disparate impacts
common to arrest-based and civil OMP-style enforcement alike,
of these residential actions, more than half of defendants who
surrendered their leases or were banned from their homes were

2010 in New York City the number of misdemeanor arrest events of white
individuals increased roughly 35% compared to increases of over 105% for
Black individuals and more than 158% for Hispanic individuals); Andrew
Golub et. al., The Race/Ethnicity Disparity in Misdemeanor Marijuana Arrests
in New York City, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 131, 131 (2007).
222. See M. Chris Fabricant, War Crimes and Misdemeanors:
Understanding “Zero-Tolerance” Policing As a Form of Collective Punishment
and Human Rights Violation, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 373, 384 (2011).
223. See id.; see generally Alexandra Natapoff, Aggregation and Urban
Misdemeanors, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1043 (2013).
224. See Michael D. Makowsky et al., To Serve and Collect: The Fiscal and
Racial Determinants of Law Enforcement, 48 J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 211 (2019).
225. See Ryley, supra note 193.
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never convicted of a crime.226
Racial disparities in civil enforcement have also been
documented in other jurisdictions in the enforcement of various
civil actions, including civil forfeitures and nuisance abatement.
For instance, in Alabama, while race is not routinely reported in
civil cases, and researchers could not determine the racial
breakdown of all defendants to civil asset forfeiture, a review of
court documents attached to civil forfeiture cases accompanied
by criminal charges identified 64% of defendants as AfricanAmerican.227 Similarly, an informal review of Seattle court
records from the 1990s found that 96% of defendants in drug
abatement cases in Seattle were racial minorities and centered
on low-income neighborhoods with majority Black residents.228
C. Collateral Consequences of Civil Enforcement
Civil enforcement actions present both similar and distinct
collateral consequences to those resulting from arrest. For one
thing, civil enforcement itself is a collateral consequence of
arrests. In addition to triggering police- or prosecutor-led
actions, arrests increasingly trigger separate civil or
administrative action outside the criminal justice system as
“immigration enforcement officials, public housing authorities,
public benefits administrators, employers, licensing authorities,
social services providers, . . . education officials,” civil agencies,
and private actors “routinely receive and review arrest
information” to guide enforcement.229
Similarly, civil enforcement’s “primary” consequences (e.g.,
eviction, license revocation, employment termination) are often
“collateral” consequences of OMP arrest-oriented tactics; as a
result, civil enforcement consequences include familiar legal,
social, and economic costs to individuals, families, and

226. See id.; see also Ryley, The NYPD Is Kicking People Out of Their
Homes, supra note 94.
227. See ALA. APPLESEED & SOUTH. POVERTY L. CTR., FORFEITING YOUR
RIGHTS: HOW ALABAMA’S PROFIT-DRIVEN CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE SCHEME
UNDERCUTS DUE PROCESS AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 13 (2015).
228. See Michelle Malkin, Seizure Disorder: Seattle's "Drug Nuisance
Abatement" Program Is a Menace to Law-Abiding Property Owners, REASON
MAG., Mar. 1999, at 55.
229. Eisha Jain, Arrests As Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 810 (2015).
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communities.230 On the other hand, unlike civil enforcement
actions, arrest-related collateral consequences include distinct
legal secondary effects such as deportation proceedings,
ineligibility for public benefits, and future sentencing, parole or
probation revocation and reincarceration.231
Temporal and resource costs also attend to these criminal
and civil actions.
Babe K. Howell has described the
underappreciated temporal, situational, and resource costs of
OMP-style custodial arrests, including: (i) overcrowding,
infestation, and inadequate sanitation and nutrition in prearraignment detention; (ii) 19.5 minutes per case for legal aid
attorneys defending the case, encompassing file review, client
interviewing, and court argument; (iii) greatly increased
temporal costs of disposition such as the application for,
completion of, and demonstration to the court of compliance with
community service requirements; (iv) fixed mandatory
surcharges and court fees resulting in civil judgments for failure
to pay (which in turn negatively impacts credit ratings); and (v)
significantly extended court appearances before final resolution
of the case for defendants who do not accept a disposition at
arraignment.232
Temporal costs imposed upon civil enforcement defendants
are again both similar and distinct. For instance, by contrast to
criminal prosecutions, civil enforcement defendants must
research and secure legal representation or appear pro se, which
in turn requires additional time and resources for fact
development, court attendance, and legal drafting.
Depending on the type of civil enforcement action initiated,
defendants experience various other temporal and resource
costs. In nuisance abatement or Padlock-Law-style suits
securing immediate closure orders, property owners may have
to terminate or suspend employees, seek new loan terms,
suspend lease payments, cancel vendor contracts and deliveries,
and more. Even if a property owner manages to negotiate a
stipulation allowing him or her to continue occupying the
premises, stipulations typically impose onerous compliance and
reporting provisions as well as opening the premises to

230. See id. at 810–11.
231. See id. at 811.
232. See Howell, supra note 178, at 293–99.
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warrantless police searches.
While deserving of further research, given the informationsharing and computerization tactics discussed infra Part I.B, it
is likely that the owners of “problem properties” prosecuted by
civil enforcement agencies are substantially more likely to face
subsequent civil and criminal enforcement prosecutions. As Issa
Kohler-Hausmann observed in the context of criminal
prosecutions, while the rate of criminal conviction falls sharply
where OMP-style arrest tactics generate mass misdemeanor
arrests, the drop in conviction rate, counterintuitively, also
produces worse outcomes for defendants collectively.233 To cope
with surging dockets, criminal courts abandon the “adjudicative
model” of court administration for the “managerial model” in
which guilt and blameworthiness are largely immaterial, and
the criminal process instead used to “sort and assess” large
populations over time, based almost exclusively on their
previous contacts with the justice system.234
Finally, civil enforcement consequences parallel the
economic and social costs for neighborhoods and larger
communities produced by arrest-based tactics, such as collective
loss of income, rising unemployment, indebtedness due to
monetary penalties and fees, and increased rates of
homelessness and unstable housing.235
The geographic
exactness of civil enforcement patterns described infra Part
III.B makes clear that police- and prosecutor-led civil
enforcement involves intentional targeting of specific
neighborhoods, likely those otherwise designated by police as
high-crime areas.
As Aya Gruber argues, “blue-lining”
neighborhoods is a function by which police seek to control “race,
space, and place,” carving out parcels of land predominantly
inhabited by low-income and Black or Hispanic residents for
heightened enforcement operations.236 Empirical research into
the social and economic costs and consequences of arrest-based
enforcement tactics therefore represents an incomplete picture
of contemporary state and local enforcement absent the
sustained study of civil enforcement operations.
233. See generally Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 221.
234. Id. at 623.
235. See Howell, supra note 178, at 306–07.
236. Aya Gruber, Commentary, Policing and "Bluelining,” 58 HOUS. L.
REV. 867, 891–901 (2021).
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CONCLUSION

Since the decline of the Warren Court, state and local law
enforcement has aggressively pursued the use of historically
“civil” actions to achieve otherwise penal goals and circumvent
long-standing constitutional and evidentiary protections. Once
adopted by a given state or locality, the desire for constitutional
avoidance is only further reinforced by the operational success
of publicly filed civil enforcement proceedings. Any rational
governmental actor, in the absence of coordinated electoral
opposition, would embrace civil enforcement—regardless of
whether there is potential financial gain for the department
itself or the state or municipality at large. By combining the
legal advantages of civil and administrative actions with the
tremendous investigatory and operational power of criminal law
enforcement, police and prosecutors increase their power at the
expense of both civilian authorities and the broader public. The
appetite of executive officials and legislators only increases with
each pilot program and tactical renovation. Thus, despite the
seeming consensus developing among policing-for-profit
reformers, in the final analysis it is certain that police- and
prosecutor-led civil enforcement will remain ascendant even
should department-level profit incentives be eliminated.
“Fine-Tuning” is not intended as merely a legal-historical
footnote describing this latest progression in the American legal
system. Instead, its conclusions have larger implications for
judicial review of state and local enforcement actions postTimbs. Given that the interests of state and local executives and
legislators are so closely aligned in police- and prosecutor-led
civil enforcement objectives, added to the inevitable growth in
the technological and operational capabilities of state and local
law enforcement in the near future, in our constitutional order
only the state and federal judiciaries stand a chance of reigning
in civil enforcement abuses. Without such an intervention, the
civil enforcement defendants facing down this Leviathan will
invariably fail in the courts. Overwhelmingly, the persons
targeted for such actions—small businesses proprietors,
working-class renters, and vehicle owners—are pro se given the
Supreme Court’s failure to recognize a Sixth Amendment
guarantee for state-appointed counsel in publicly filed civil
actions. And even the small fraction of defendants wealthy
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enough to afford a lawyer face near-certain defeat as a result of
the minimal constitutional, evidentiary, and other limitations on
publicly filed civil actions. All the while, the Court’s outdated
distinction between criminal and constitutional civil procedural
protections allows the status quo to continue unabated, leaving
low-income renters and small businesses no recourse.
Together, the forces conspiring for police- and prosecutorled civil enforcement’s expansion ought to raise a red flag for the
judiciary. The innovations developed over the past five decades
have driven the frequency and severity of civil enforcement
operations to unprecedented levels in America: data-driven
policing techniques implemented by big-city law enforcement in
the 1990s—statistical modeling, crime mapping, etc.—permitted
more efficient allocation of departmental personnel and
resources.
And the advent of digitization and computer
networking in the 2000s produced yet another technological
growth bubble in the growing virtual dragnet of interagency
agreements allowing police and prosecutors access to municipal
code enforcement agency data (e.g., land management, health,
land use, etc.).
The impact of data-driven policing and
digitization will surely pale in comparison to that of near-future
developments in predictive policing, mapping algorithms,
remote-sensing, and other emerging technologies. Judicial delay
in revisiting outdated “civil” and “criminal” distinctions will only
serve to enshrine this dangerous enforcement trend as a
permanent feature of the American legal system.
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